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THE RANGE OF THE LOGOS-TITLE IN THE PROLOGUE TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Notwithstanding the great amount of exegetical labor expended on the Fourth Gospel, much of it with the special end in view of ascertaining its doctrinal character, some of the foremost biblico-theological problems to which the Gospel gives rise still remain *sub judice*. One of these is the question of the precise reference of the chief christological titles employed. Are these titles given to Christ from the point of view of the preincarnate state and thence carried into the incarnate life of the Saviour, or does the Evangelist use them of the incarnate Christ exclusively, so that they lack all bearing on the premundane and preincarnate stages of our Lord's existence? In the former case their significance will not be confined to the sphere of soteriology, or of christology in its purely soteriological aspect, but will extend into the doctrines of creation and providence, and may even reach up into the ontological problem of the divine nature and mode of existence as contemplated in themselves. As indicated by our form of statement there is no absolute alternative involved: reference of these titles to the preincarnate Christ does not exclude, but includes, their application to the incarnate life as well. The exclusiveness is found with the defenders of the view according to which the names describe the God-Man and predicate of Him something that is true only in virtue of the incarnation. What applies to the original existence of Christ will remain true and continue operative in the life on earth, but the rule does not work conversely, that what applies to the incarnate state must necessarily reach back into the life preceding the incarnation. The sole point at issue therefore is, whether the attributes or functions expressed by the names under debate first originated when Christ appeared in the flesh, or whether their emergence in the earthly life of Jesus is a mere continuation, in a new concrete form, of something that had been predicable of Him before.

In order to preclude confusion of thought another distinction should be drawn at the outset. It is one thing to ascribe to the Evangelist the use of one or more of these names as significant of relations and functions pertaining to Christ in the preincarnate or premundane state, and quite another thing to believe that he uses them loosely, by way of anticipation, where he speaks of the Saviour's original existence, fully conscious that in the strict sense of the terms they belong to the later stage of His life. The mere fact that one of these names and some preincarnate or originally divine attribute are joined together cannot, without more, be held to prove the inherent reference

of that name to the larger or eternal aspects of Christ's Person. The use of a name is often far wider than the range of its inherent significance or of the point of view which originally determined its choice. When certain things are affirmed in connection with the Logos, it by no means follows that He is called the Logos in virtue of these things or even was the Logos when these things took place. The Evangelist's intention might simply be to affirm the things referred to of Him who afterwards and for other reasons came to be the Logos. We shall, therefore, have to put the question sharply in each separate case, whether the function affirmed is a function of the Person of Christ in general, here incidentally called Logos, or a function specifically connected with his Logos-character, a Logos-function as such, the nature of the function inducing the use of the name.

The three titles in regard to which the said difference of opinion prevails are Logos, Son of God, Only-Begotten Son (or God Only-Begotten). As more or less formal names of the Saviour they are clearly distinct from other designations which partake rather of the nature of descriptive metaphors. It is true, Zahn denies this of Logos and would consider it as a figure entirely on a line with "the life", "the light", "the vine". Even when the Evangelist singles it out from among other metaphors applied to Christ, to use it as subject for a number of statements, this is done, Zahn thinks, with full consciousness of the metaphorical intent, so that, in order to render the writer's meaning exactly, one would have to paraphrase: In the beginning was He who may be fitly compared to the word of God, etc.¹ It is, however, doubtful whether the Gospel ever uses other conceptions such as "light" and "life", without additional qualification, entirely after the same fashion as Logos, to designate the Person of Christ in the concrete. The Prologue says: "the Logos was", but: "in Him was life", "and the life (that was in Him) was the light of men". "The life" and "the light" remain abstract conceptions, although, of course, their reality is concentrated in the personal Christ. In verses 7, 8, it is true, τὸ φῶς is used as a designation of the historic Jesus. By the side of this may be placed 3:19–21, although here the personal interpretation is not necessary. But even so there remains a perceptible difference between such a way of speaking, where the identification of the person with the abstract idea is led up to by previous statement, and the procedure of verse 1 in the Prologue, where, wholly without preliminaries, ὁ λόγος is introduced as a fixed designation.² We have sufficient warrant, therefore, for placing ὁ λόγος on a line with

¹ *Das Ev. des Joh.* pp. 97–106. Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert (Freiburger Theol. Stud.* 1910, 2) distinguishes only between the trinitarian, ontological interpretation of the Logos-name and its metaphorical interpretation, pp. 3 ff. From the sequel of the discussion it will appear that in order to reach clearness three exegetical positions are to be distinguished: 1) the name is not, strictly speaking, a name, but a metaphor; 2) it is a real name, but a name descriptive of function only; 3) it is a name used ontologically to describe inherent mode of provenience or existence. The view of Jannaris *ZNTW*, 1901, pp. 13–26, according to which logos in the Prologue is not even a metaphorical name of Christ, but simply God's utterance at creation, may be left out of account.

² In 1 Jno. 1:1, 2 "the word of life" is understood by some exegetes abstractly "the message concerning the life", notwithstanding the obvious allusion to the Prologue in ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. Others insist upon the concrete sense of "Logos". Zahn *Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 103 has most convincingly shown that the latter must be intended by his explanation of the peculiar construction περι τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς. He observes that by writing τὸν λόγον τῆς ζωῆς ... ἀπαγγέλλομεν the author would have left open the abstract interpretation: "we declare the message of life". In order to preclude this and to convey unambiguously what he had in mind

the other two designations as a formal name of Christ.

The various positions taken in regard to these names may be classified as follows. First there is the extreme view of Zahn, who would restrict all three to the manifestation of Christ in the flesh.³ Zahn, of course, finds in John the doctrine of a real preëxistence of Christ, but in his view no denomination applies to the preëxistent one as such except the simple θεός of 1:1^c. Next comes the view which after the same manner restricts “Son” and “Only-Begotten”, but allows an exception for Logos regarding this at least as a name applicable to the preincarnate, if not the premundane, Christ. Among the advocates of this view may be named Lücke,⁴ Luthard,⁵ Weiss,⁶ Beyschlag,⁷ and Harnack.⁸ One step farther go those who assign “Only-Begotten”, together with Logos to the premundane and preincarnate Christ, but place the simple “Son” this side of the incarnation. This is given as the view of Biedermann and Schanz.⁹ Formally resembling it, but with a different

from the beginning, viz., that the personal Logos is the object of the ἀπαγγέλλειν, he, by manner of afterthought, changes the construction and inserts the περί. When the message is “concerning the Word”, then “the Word” is personal. That even the neuter pronoun ὃ in verse 1 has such a personal reference follows from ἐωράκαμεν, for an abstract message cannot be seen. In verse 2 ἡ ζωὴ is also a personal designation of the Saviour, because of ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἐφανερώθη, and because it also is the object of “seeing”. This comes nearer to the peculiar use of ὁ λόγος in the Prologue than anything in the Gospel.

³ *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 82, 97 ff. Nevertheless Zahn affirms p. 464 that according to 10:36 the sonship involves the θεός εἶναι. This would seem to carry the sonship back into the θεότης. In restricting all these names to the incarnate Christ Zahn has a precursor in von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*² I, pp. 118 ff.

⁴ *Commentar*³ I, pp. 344, 362.

⁵ *Das Joh. Ev.* I, pp. 298 ff.

⁶ *Lehrbuch*⁴ par. 143, 145.

⁷ *N. T. Theol.* II, pp. 422, 425.

⁸ *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u Kirche*, II, pp. 189–231.

With this group may be classified Spitta, *Das Johannes-Evangelium* (1910), who recognizes the cosmical and even pretemporal reference of the Logos-name, but assigns 1:1–5 and 1:14 (in part) to the “Bearbeiter”, to whose account is also put in the sequel of the gospel everything in connection with the other names that couples these with the idea of preëxistence, pp. 36–53.

⁹ By Haltzmann, *Lehrb. der N. T. Theol* II, p. 437, note 1 (omitted in the 2d ed.). This, however, seems to rest rather on an inference than on the direct affirmation of these writers. Cpr. Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II, 115–120; Schanz, *Commentar*, pp. 98–99.

At first sight it would seem inevitable that all who read in 1:18 μονογενῆς θεός should connect the name Monogenes with the eternal, divine life of Christ. But the example of Harnack and Zahn, who both strongly advocate this reading, shows that this does not follow. Μονογενῆς and θεός are not by Zahn attributively combined, so that the former would qualify Christ in his deity, but are understood as describing: the one subject in two aspects, on the one hand as Only-Begotten (through the incarnation), on the other hand as divine. Harnack does not even consider the deity as something ontologically carried back into the preëxistent state, but as resting on an ethico-religious basis. The sharp theological antithesis, God or man, is in his view foreign to the Evangelist.

distribution of the names, is the view of Belser, who, like Zahn, makes Logos a designation of the incarnate Christ, but speaks of “the eternal only-born Son of God in his historical appearance”, making both the other titles refer to the Saviour in his pretemporal existence.¹⁰ Finally there are those who make the simple “Son” follow Logos and Monogenes into the class of names descriptive of the preëxistent, eternal Christ.¹¹ Among the numerous representatives of this group may be named Godet,¹² Meyer,¹³ Keil,¹⁴ Köstlin,¹⁵ Hilgenfeld,¹⁶ Scholten,¹⁷ Immer,¹⁸ Thoma,¹⁹ Pfleiderer,²⁰ Lipsius,²¹ Oscar Holtzmann.²² It is moreover the view which has behind it the weight of authority of the orthodox church-tradition from the time of Origen onward.²³

A glance at these several views and at the distribution of the prominent names connected with them suggests the following significant fact. The traditional exegesis of the orthodox church in tracing back these distinctive names of Christ to the state of preëxistence receives support from the foremost representatives of the extreme critical school, which in its estimate of the date, the provenience and the historical truthfulness of the Gospel stands at the farthest remove from the conservative and apologetic position in regard to such matters. And on the other hand the great modern apologetes of the Gospel who have done so much to vindicate the orthodox view of the church in regard to its Apostolic origin and trustworthiness show not seldom a tendency to part company with the church-exegesis so far as the titles under review are concerned, assigning one or two or even all three of them to the incarnate Christ and insisting in the same measure upon their non-applicability to the immanent Godhead, the opposite of which the orthodox theology has

We know of no representative of the alternative view, the association of Monogenes with the incarnation and the carrying back of the generic sonship into the eternal life of Christ. This position is quite possible in itself and quite defensible from an exegetical point of view.

¹⁰ *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 1903, pp. 483–519. Differently in his *Einleitung* (1905) p. 285 “Der Logos ist eine Person ... und selber Gott, und als solcher ist er Schöpfer und Erhalter der Welt”.

¹¹ The title “Son of Man” might have been added to the other three, since it begins more and more to be recognized as in John’s Gospel significantly associated with the glory either of the preëxistent or of the postexistent state.

¹² *Commentaire*,² II, p. 79.

¹³ *Gospel of John*, p. 64.

¹⁴ *Commentar*, p. 110.

¹⁵ *Lehrbegriff*, pp. 89, ff. 96, pp. 149 ff.

¹⁶ *Die Evangel.*, p. 332.

¹⁷ *Het. Ev. naar Joh.*, pp. 82 ff.

¹⁸ *Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 509.

¹⁹ *Die Genesis des Joh. Ev.*, pp. 184 ff.

²⁰ *Urchr.*² II, pp. 463 ff.

²¹ *Dogm.*² pp. 465 ff.

²² *Das. Joh. Ev.*, p. 82.

²³ In the above classification the view which makes the subject of the Prologue first attain to personal existence through the incarnation has been left out of account. According to this view that which previously existed in God unhypostatically was already as such the Logos of God. The view, therefore, would fall under the second rubric. Cpr. Lücke, *Commentar*,³ I, p. 361; Holtzmann-Bauer, *Hand-Comm.*³ IV, 1, p. 54.

always emphatically maintained, its interest lying in the defense of the deity of Christ which seems so obviously bound up with the pretemporal reference of these names. The phenomenon here noted is not, of course, an isolated one; it furnishes but one striking instance of the curious alignment which in exegetical and biblico-theological matters tends to group together conservative scholars with their extreme critical antipodes and to force apart the same conservative scholars from such as are their natural allies in the great critical debate. A high exegesis is joined to a low critical view of the Gospel, and a high critical estimate of the Gospel in the case of the apologetes is accompanied by a low exegesis. But mystifying as this alignment at first sight may be, it is quite capable of rational explanation. The negative critical school, especially in its older Tübingen form, contended that the Gospel is essentially a philosophico-theological document, that it contains speculation and not, in the main, history, and that in this speculative complexion the teaching of Jesus which it pretends to record is radically distinct from and irreconcilable with the kind of teaching preserved in the Synoptics. It is therefore natural for this school of critics to find not only a solid substance of doctrine in the Gospel, but also to consider the doctrine found of the highest speculative type. Now this inevitably brings their exegetical conclusions into close touch with the church-theology, for the church has always found in the Fourth Gospel the main source for its teaching on the deep things of the Godhead. On the other hand it is but human in the apologetes of the historical character of the Gospel to endeavor to approximate its doctrinal content as much as possible to the current conception of the Synoptical teaching of Jesus, for the simple reason that thus one of the chief obstacles to its historicity can be removed. Thus it comes about that a certain predilection not only for an unspeculative, but even for an untheological and undoctinal interpretation of the statements of the Gospel can be observed in apologetic circles. The tendency becomes doubly strong where it receives reënforcement from the widely-prevailing Ritschlian antipathy to everything that savors of the speculative and metaphysical in Christian teaching. Harnack's exegesis of the Gospel with its sharp distinction between the speculatively colored Prologue and the absolutely undoctinal body of the Gospel and its refusal to recognize the Prologue as in any sense a programme for the Gospel-teaching, making it a mere accommodation to the standpoint of the readers, clearly reveals the influence of this latter motive. But the tendency as such is not dependent on this secondary influence for its existence. It is plainly perceptible in cases where every suspicion of Ritschlian sympathies is excluded, e.g., in the case of so orthodox a writer as Zahn. For such as still set store by the great theological doctrines for which the Fourth Gospel preëminently has furnished the basis, and therefore continue to attach not merely an historical, but also a specifically theological value to its teaching, the tendency spoken of may easily seem fraught with the danger of depriving whatever success has attended the apologetic efforts on behalf of the historicity of the Gospel of much of its value. One may be inclined to feel that the historical character of the document has been saved at the expense of its theological importance. We are encouraged to maintain or regain our confidence in the actual provenience of this body of teaching from the lips of Jesus, but somehow in the apologetic process which has restored our confidence the former richness and pregnancy and distinctiveness of the teaching seem to have been lost to such an extent, that we are no longer able to reap from it any appreciable addition to our store of knowledge obtained from the Synoptical sources.

As already stated, among the doctrines thus affected the Christological truths which have always been considered characteristic of our Lord's Johannine teaching stand out prominently. Among these again the Logos-doctrine occupies an important place. It is a matter of considerable moment, theologically speaking, whether Christ bears this name in connection with his appearance in the flesh and his soteriological activity, or whether it belongs to Him in virtue of what He is and

does apart from and antecedently to his work as incarnate Saviour of the world. In attempting to register the theological consequences of the adoption of the former view, we naturally think first of the doctrine of the Trinity, specifically of the relation within the Godhead between the Father and the Son. The name Logos has long since been understood as intended to throw light on this trinitarian mystery. The point of comparison is given a psychological turn and the thought results that as the logos stands related to the person who produces it, so the Son stands related to the Father. In other words the idea of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father is found expressed in the Logos-name. The name characterizes this generation as an intellectual process.²⁴ The ontological interpretation of the Logos-name either in this specialized or in a more general form is not confined to the older and oldest exponents of the church-theology; it still finds advocates among modern exegetes both of the orthodox and of the liberal school, although, owing to the fact that the question is seldom raised in a sufficiently pointed and explicit form, it proves difficult to ascertain the opinion of most writers in regard to it.²⁵

²⁴ The idea reaches back into the patristic theologizing. Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland, Freib. Theol. Stud.*, 1910, II, p. 3, refers for the patristic evidence to Petavius, *De Trinitate*, II, 11, VI, 5 ff. and quotes the definition of Aquinas from the *Summa Theol.* I, 34: Verbum proprie dictum in divinis personaliter accipitur et est proprium nomen personae Filii; significat enim quendam emanationem intellectus ... hujusmodi processio dicitur generatio. Cpr. also Schanz, *Commentar*, pp. 70, 71.

²⁵ Of conservatives we may mention Lasson, *Das ewige Wort*, p. 5; Simon, *Der Logos*, p. 5; Westcott, *the Gospel according to St. John*, p. 3 "the word Logos includes the conception of the immanent Word"; "the economic Trinity, the Trinity of revelation is shown to answer to an essential Trinity"; Lütgert, *Beiträge zur Förderung Christl. Theol.*, 1899, p. 125: "nicht um der Welt willen hat Gott einen Logos, sondern er ist in Ihm selbst, in seinem eigenen geistartigen Wesen, das sich nur in's Wort zu fassen vermag begründet." Lütgert takes the peculiar view that the representation of Christ as Logos stands in the service of the spiritualizing tendency of the Gospel, that it lies on the line of the contrast between word and miracle. The majority of the Catholic exegetes and dogmatists adhere to the old tradition. So Scheeben, *Handb. der kath. Dogmatik* I, p. 843; Pohle, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*, I³, p. 324; Krebs, *Freib. Theol. Stud.*, 1910, II, pp. 3 ff.; an exception among the Catholics is Belser, *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1903, pp. 483–519, who explains the Logos-name from the work of the incarnate Christ; differently in *Einleitung*² p. 285, where the creation and preservation of the world are associated with the name. Belser does not deny the eternal generation; the difference between him and the other Catholics is that he does not find it in the Logos-title as such. Among liberal Protestant writers of recent date the following with varying clearness incline towards considering Logos a name of being and origin as well as of function: Weizsäcker, *Das apost. Zeitalter*,² p. 552 "im Sinn der wesentlichen Einheit mit Gott"; Holtzmann, *Lehrb. d. Neutest. Theol.* II¹, p. 392, through the Logos "rundet sich der Begriff Gottes in sich selbst ab"; Grill, *Untersuchungen über die Entstehung des vierten Evang.* I, pp. 167, 169, 175 ff., "Er ist Logos, ist Wort in höherem Sinn, schon vor Entstehung der Welt, schon ehe er in der Welt und zu der Welt geredet hat: schon ehe Gott durch Schöpfung und Offenbarung so geredet hat, dass ein kreatürliches Gottesbewusstsein entstand, hat er ausserzeitlich und seinem eigensten Wesen entsprechend, sich bei sich selbst ausgesprochen, ist er im Logos κατ' ἑξ. sich Selbst gegenständlich geworden".

The problem is a complicated one and for successful treatment needs sharp separation of the various elements that enter into it. The following questions should be kept distinct: 1) Does the Evangelist make ontological or purely functional statements concerning the Person whom he calls the Logos? 2) If ontological statements are made, do they concern the specific point of the provenience of the Logos from God? 3) Are the ontological statements associated with the inherent meaning of the name Logos? 4) Is there reason to believe, apart from the direct statements of the Prologue, that the writer can have attached to the Logos-name an ontological and specifically an ontogenetic significance?

The first question is the easiest to answer. That verses 1 and 2 are meant as ontological statements descriptive of the premundane relation of the Logos to God, is admitted on well-nigh every hand. The three points emphasized are the eternity, the personal God-wardness and the deity of the Logos. It is true, these three great affirmations are not made for the purely theological purpose of explaining the inner mode of the divine existence. What they predicate about the Logos is introduced because of its bearing on the functions afterwards ascribed to Him. To show the qualification of the Logos for these functions it was of supreme importance to answer the three questions: 1) When was the Logos? 2) Where was the Logos? 3) What was the Logos? Although, therefore, the writer's mind is even in these two verses already fixed upon the significance of the Logos for the world, none the less what he affirms concerns the God-ward aspect of the life of the Logos, it is ontological and not functional in its essence: it recurs to explain the function upon the mode of being. It implies that there is more to the Logos than is involved in His functional relation to the world. To put it sharply: before the world was not merely were these three things true of the Logos; they were true of Him altogether irrespective of the actual or possible existence of the world, would have been true if no world had come into being. It is not permissible to eliminate the ontological element from verses 1 and 2 by carrying into them the Philonic idea of the Logos as a world-plan or a world-potency. In that case the whole distinction between the ontological and the functional would be obliterated; to say that the Logos as world-plan or world-potency was in the

On the other hand Pfeleiderer, *Urchristenthum*², II, 463, thinks that the Evangelist consciously avoided all speculation as to the origin of the Logos: "er gibt keine nähere Begründung dafür, dass oder warum es einen Logos gebe, sucht ihn auch nicht irgendwie aus dem göttlichen Wesen abzuleiten—er scheut die gefährlichen Spuren gnostischer Emanationen und Theogonien." Spitta, *Das Johannes-Ev.* pp. 50, 51, conjectures that the designation of Jesus as Logos had its origin in the superscription of the Gospel as ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου I. X. (Cpr. Mk. 1:1); this invited the "Bearbeiter" to preface the "Grundschrift", which contained the account of the life of Jesus, with a dogmatic introduction "welche auf den geheimnisvollen göttlichen Ursprung Christi zurückgreift. Damit sinkt die gepriesene Spekulation ... allerdings sehr von ihrer Höhe herab, und das Geheimnis des mystischen Eingangs wird sehr schlicht, wenn es zu seiner Keimzelle eine prosaische Buchüberschrift hat." According to Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.*, p. 123, the Johannine Logos has nothing Philonic about him: "er ist das befehlende und offenbarende Wort Gottes. Man braucht den Jüdisch-biblischen Ideenkreis nicht zu verlassen um zu sehen woher er stammt; die Meinung dass den Juden solche Hypostasierungen fern lagen trifft nicht zu." As to the exegesis of 1:3, 4 Wellhausen is frankly pessimistic: "Wer 1:3, 4 verstehen muss, ist nicht zu beneiden". Schwartz (*Aporien im vierten Ev.*, Nachr. v. d. Königl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Gött. 1907–1908, p. 548) regards the Greek element even in Philo a mere superficial varnish and recognizes only the meaning "Word".

beginning, and was with God, would only affirm the eternity and the eternal presence with God of the world in these two respects; it would not give the Logos ontological significance apart from the world. But this understanding of the words, while it might apply to the first of the three affirmations (“in the beginning was the Logos”), can scarcely apply to the second (“the Logos ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, the Logos was in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God” Westcott), since it is difficult to conceive of a personal, eternal, God-related being with no other *raison d’être* than the mediation of the origin and organization of the world. And most certainly such an understanding of the words is excluded by the third affirmation (θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος). To limit the being of the Logos to his significance for the world, and yet to make this Logos partake of the divine nature, would mean to pass the line that separates theism from pantheism and to carry the principium of the world as an eternal reality back into the immanent life of God.

Since the third question concerns equally the general ontological problem just touched upon and the specific problem of ontological provenience, we must immediately raise it at this point with reference to the conclusion reached, even before we attempt to answer the second question. Is there any association between the inherent meaning of the Logos-name and the facts affirmed about the intra-divine existence of the Logos? Is there anything in the Logos-conception as such that will explain His being in the beginning, his being πρὸς τὸν θεόν and his being divine? Here, of course, we are face to face with the question, whether Logos means to the Evangelist “reason” or “word” (either in the sense of τὸ λέγειν, the act, or in that of τὸ λεγόμενον the product). The preponderance of opinion seems to incline towards the latter interpretation.²⁶ It is, however, hardly necessary to press for a decision on this point at the present stage of our enquiry. At first sight, to be sure, it might seem as if the interpretation “reason” offered a better, or perhaps the only, possibility for an association of the Logos-concept with the immanent ontological life of the Godhead. “Reason” is a psychological term which calls up to the mind the inner structure of our spiritual being. “Word”, on the other hand, almost inevitably suggests the presence of an outside reality to which the word is addressed. The impression thus created is frequently strengthened by applying to our problem the old philosophical distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, the former designating the process of thought on its inward side as “reason”, the latter the same in its utterance *ad extra* as “speech”.²⁷ Decisive neither of these two considerations can be called. It is not impossible to view the process or product of speaking on its internal, mental side as an integral process of the personal life and on this principle to utilize the Logos-title for a trinitarian construction. And on the other hand it is equally possible to conceive of “reason” as a function or process turned outward having a cosmical object to operate upon, so that a reference to the created world would, even on this rendering, fully satisfy the terms of the

²⁶ The arguments are stated with great clearness and skill by Zahn, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 103–107.

²⁷ The distinction is of Stoic origin. By the Stoics it was employed in an anthropological sense, not with reference to the universal logos. It is frequently asserted that Philo carries the distinction into the Logos of God. Aall. *Gesch. der Logos-Idee in der Griech. Phil.* I, p. 197 denies this. The fact is that in the one passage where Philo introduces the distinction (*Vit. Mos.*, III, 13 II 154 Mangey) he does not explicitly apply it to the divine Logos, but only to that in man. After distinguishing between the Logos περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων and the Logos περὶ τῶν ὀρατῶν, he adds: ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. The idea therefore is applied to the divine Logos by way of illustration, not as adequate terminology. Cpr. Grill, *Unters. üb. d. Entsteh. des viert. Ev.* I, pp. 146–147.

comparison and render the application to the purely immanent life of God unnecessary. How possible the latter is may be seen from Philo. On the whole Philo's Logos means "reason". And yet Philo in the development of his Logos-doctrine pursues a purely cosmical interest. The internal life of God lies for him beyond the reach of all human knowledge; the conception of the Logos as the reason in God does not detract in the least from his uniform and consistent application of the idea ad extra. It should be remembered in this connection that ὁ λόγος even in unphilosophical language can be the objective reason in things, their intelligible aspect, and not merely the faculty of reasoning in the subjective sense.²⁸ Thus it will be also seen, that the conception of the Logos as ἐνδιάθετος does not carry with it the true immanence of the same in the ontological sense. Philo's λόγος ἐνδιάθετος as applied to God is not the faculty of reasoning in God, nor even the process of reasoning in God, but the ideal product of the divine reasoning, the κόσμος νοητός, which stands related to the λόγος προφορικός as the plan of a building to its execution. The λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is no less than the other the λόγος θεοῦ ἤδη κοσμοποιούτος.²⁹ The ontological immanence of the church-theology lies along deeper lines than this whole distinction.

Is there anything to indicate that the writer apprehended the statements in verse 1 in terms of the Logos-concept? With reference to the first statement this would seem excluded from the nature of the case, for eternity cannot be expressed in terms of the Logos as such. But in regard to the other two statements it is quite conceivable. The author might mean to affirm that as the logos is most closely identified with the person whose logos it is, so the Person of Christ in his premundane life is as closely identified with God. It is true the preposition πρὸς c. Acc. would not be the most natural form of expression for such a thought; some other construction, like παρά with the Dative, would appear better suited for the purpose. Still this objection has little weight in view of the fact, that in the present case what is compared from the point of its close identification with God, is a person, and the writer could reckon with this personal element by the use of πρὸς c. Acc. instead of παρά c. Dat., the identification of person with person not being a mere matter of fact but a matter of purposeful direction. We shall have to say, therefore, that there is nothing strained in this interpretation: both the πρὸς θεὸν εἶναι and the θεὸν εἶναι admit of being conceived as implications of the logos-figure. Christ's eternal communion with God and his participation in the θεότης can properly be compared to the closeness of inbeing of reason or speech with regard to the reasoning or speaking person.³⁰ It will further be noticed that this interpretation of the Evangelist's statements easily adapts itself to the obvious purpose which, as above stated, these statements are by the context shown to subserve. If the "being-towards-God" and the "being-God" furnish the basis for the creative and revealing function of Christ, for his Logos-activity towards the world, and if this "being-towards-God" and "being-God" are in themselves a sort of Logos-existence, then the thought results that Logos-function is grounded in Logos-nature. That the Son can be described as Logos immanently with reference to God explains how he can act in the capacity of Logos with reference to the world. Though a twofold turn is given to the figure there is a point in which the two comparisons meet: He who has the closest logos-like union with God can bring the fullest and clearest logos-like revelation of God.

While this is an exegetical possibility, and there is nothing to contraindicate it, we shall have

²⁸ Cpr. Lücke, *Commentar über das Ev. des Joh.*³, I, p. 251.

²⁹ *Opif. Mundi* 6, 1, 7 (Cohn and Wendland).

³⁰ The Logos-figure so understood is a spiritual analogon to the corporeally expressed figure of 1:18 ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, with the same peculiar construction to express the combination of rest in with direction towards. Cpr. also the comparison in 1 Cor. 2:11.

to admit that just as little is there anything in the text that positively requires it. The mere fact that the writer uses Logos as the subject of the affirmations made can scarcely be regarded as doing this. At first glance, it is true, the reader will be inclined to think, if the Logos was in the beginning, was towards God and was God, then he must have been these three things in his capacity of Logos, and thus will conclude that the Logos-name has before all else an immanent Godward reference. A moment's reflection, however, will show that such a conclusion is premature. We must here reckon with the possibility referred to in our introductory remarks, that the writer may have used the Logos-name in verses 1 and 2 by way of anticipation, so that the three great affirmations made would be predicates of the subject of the sentence but not of Him in His Logos-capacity. In order to establish the possibility of this latter view it is, of course, necessary to show, that in the given context there would be a plausible reason to introduce such an anticipation. As a matter of fact it is easy to point out such a reason. As already observed the author makes the three statements for the specific purpose of laying a basis in the eternal intra-divine life of Christ for his creative and revealing activity in time, i.e., for his subsequent Logos-function. In order to make us feel that what he affirms has this bearing upon the Logos-function, he might very appropriately name the subject of the affirmations ὁ Λόγος without thereby implying that He had these attributes in virtue of an immanent Logos-character in an ontological sense. To put it in simple paraphrase the peculiar form of statement may easily to his mind have had this meaning: He who was to function as the Logos was in the beginning, was towards God, was God.

We may now turn to the second of the four questions above formulated and enquire whether in our verses there is any ontological statement that concerns the specific point of the provenience of the Logos from God. It was noted above that the ontological interpretation of the words in question has been most frequently given this specific turn. The Logos-figure implied in the name is regarded as involving two distinct elements, that of causality in general and that of intellectual causality in particular. It is a figure descriptive of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father *per modum intellectus*. So far as the opening two verses of the Prologue are concerned it is plain that no *explicit* warrant for this dogmatic construction is contained therein. The three great deliverances all presuppose the existence of the Logos as a given fact and in themselves enunciate nothing about His provenience. He was in the beginning, was towards God and was God—this they affirm but not how He came into being or came to be this. It would have been easy for the author, had the making of a statement about the provenience of the eternal Christ lain in his plan, to do this by employing in the second sentence the preposition ἐκ instead of πρὸς. In not availing himself of this opportunity he clearly shows that for the practical purpose in hand (the grounding of the revealing function of the Logos in His relation to God) not the origin of the Logos but His mode of existence was regarded by him of prime importance. And yet we should be scarcely warranted in saying, that this fact absolutely precludes us from finding any reflection upon the provenience of the Logos here or from crediting it to the writer in general. What is not explicitly affirmed in the three statements as such, might possibly be implied in the subject of the affirmations, that is in the Logos-name itself. On the supposition that the *tertium comparationis* in this name lies in the point of causation, Logos would be equivalent to “one who is engendered of God as the word or reason are produced by the speaker or thinker”. If such an understanding of the term was current in the circle of the writer and the readers, the word Logos itself, without further unfolding, would be able to convey it in all its pregnancy of meaning. Paraphrased the statement would read: “The God-engendered One (= Logos) was in the beginning, and the God-engendered One was towards God, and the God-engendered One was God”. In the thought that provenience determines mode of existence there is, of course, nothing unusual. Even the Prologue

itself offers material for its illustration. In both verse 14 and verse 18 the idea finds expression that Christ in virtue of his sonship carries the fulness of grace and truth in Himself and so can bring the supreme revelation of God. And in verse 18 this even assumes a form strikingly analogous to the thought discovered in verse 1 on the view under discussion. Here the μονογενής- relation to God and the being εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς are joined together, after precisely the same fashion as in verse 1 the λόγος- relation to God and the being πρὸς τὸν θεόν are joined. The only difference between these two cases is that μονογενής by its very form suggests the idea of provenience, whereas in λόγος this idea would be clothed in a more recondite figure, which for its understanding would require the help of current association, But this difference does not touch the main analogy consisting in this, that the being-with-God is significantly joined to the being-from-God.³¹

³¹ In the above statement it is assumed that μονογενής is for John not simply equivalent to μόνος “unique” either in the literal or in the metaphorical sense of “dearly beloved”. In three of the four instances of its occurrence in the Gospel it stands in a context which makes the idea of γεννᾶσθαι from God prominent. The same is true of 1 Jno. 4:9. Besides this in Jno. 1:14, the idea of endowment through derivation is plainly present. The words δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός are not a mere comparison “a glory as great as an only-begotten son would have”, but a statement of full correspondence between the idea of the glory pertaining to the μονογενής-relation and its reality in Christ, as Godet well formulates it: “une gloire comme doit être celle du Fils venant d’auprès du Père”. The παρὰ is not to be construed with the -γενής in μονογενής, for it is not the proper preposition for this; it belongs either to the implied idea of “receiving” (so Zahn) or to the implied idea of “coming” (so Godet) from the Father. The Evangelist measures the fulness of the glory of Christ by a twofold standard: 1) it is the glory of a μονογενής; 2) it is a glory of one who was endowed by or came from the Father, i.e. in his historic appearance. The coordination of these two standards appears more natural, if in μονογενής there is felt the same idea of the Son’s deriving his glory from the Father which is present in the παρὰ πατρός. The whole statement amounts to: such a glory as the Only-Begotten has in virtue of his begetting and in virtue of his endowment or commission from the Father. Whether the γίνεσθαι implied in μονογενής relates to the eternal generation or to the virgin-birth is, of course, immaterial to the point of the argument, which concerns only the idea of determination of being through birth. As to Jno. 3:16, 18, here the reference of the μονογενής to the preëxistent state of Christ is plain: God gave, sent his μονογενής; He therefore was the μονογενής antecedently to being sent: the very greatness of the sacrifice lay in the giving of Him as μονογενής. The idea of a being begotten from God which occurs in the preceding context here relates to man, not to Christ. But it is at least a debatable question, whether the statement of verse 12 “If I told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things”, which has given exegetes so much trouble, does not allude to a higher, absolutely heavenly generation in comparison with which even the regeneration of believers may be called an earthly thing. Finally in Jno. 1:18 (no matter whether μονογενής θεός or ὁ μονογενής υἱός be read, and whether in the former case μονογενής be construed with θεός or a supplied υἱός, or whether μονογενής be taken as a noun, θεός as the attribute), the qualification to declare God, to explain which μονογενής serves, is far better accounted for by “only-begotten” than by “only”. The reference of the words ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς to the divine life of the Saviour deserves the preference by far over Zahn’s proposal to

The assumption that the Logos-name is used in the opening sentences of the Prologue, not by way of anticipation, but with inherent ontological significance receives some support from the extraordinary emphasis placed upon it by its repetition in the second and third clauses. The question may be legitimately put whether a simple statement. "In the beginning was the word and was towards God and was God" would not have been more in keeping with the functional conception of the name and its purely proleptic employment here, than the strongly reiterative form of speaking adopted by the Evangelist. The sequel of the Prologue suggests that rhetorical motives may have had something to do with the peculiar structure of the opening verses. But this peculiar structure is not entirely dependent on the repetition of the word Logos. It is difficult to dismiss the impression that, when the Evangelist takes pains to say that it was the Logos who was towards God, and who was God, and when in the next following sentence by means of οὗτος he again emphasizes that it is only the Logos of whom this can be predicated, there must have been some vital connection in his mind between the name employed and the great things affirmed.

The only other statement in the Prologue which would admit of a strictly ontological interpretation connected with the inherent meaning of the Logos-name is the first clause of verse 4 "In Him (i.e., in the Logos) was life". This considered in itself could be understood of the purely immanent life possessed by Christ before the world was, and it could be associated with his Logos-character, either on the general principle of identification with God or on the more special ground of derivation from God. In view, however, of the place given to the statement immediately after verse 3, descriptive of the Logos-activity in the creation of the world, it is preferable to understand the words in question not absolutely of Christ's own divine life, but of the life-giving potency that existed in Him with reference to the world, a view also favored by the immediately following clause: "and the life (that was in Him)³² was the light of men". We move here no longer in the sphere of ontology but of function.

Our enquiry so far has yielded only the result that the Gospel-statements were found to allow of and be adjustable to an ontological application of the Logos-idea on the writer's part. Positive exegetical indications absolutely compelling this view we were not able to discover. The result may seem meagre and unsatisfactory. Its negative character, however, should not be allowed overmuch weight as an argument against the view discussed and in favor of the purely functional interpretation. For it must be remembered that the restriction of the Logos-idea to the cosmical or soteriological significance of Christ is hardly in a better position. That Logos means the utterance of the creative power of God or his revelation concentrated in the Person of Christ, the Evangelist does not tell us in so many words either; we are left to infer it from the connections in which the term is introduced. In 1:14 the sense of "revelation" may seem implied in that the Logos become flesh is made the object of a beholding on the disciples' part, one who carried the pleroma of grace and truth in Himself, the counterpart of the Old Testament Shekhina as a self-manifestation of God. But absolutely certain that these things, plainly enough affirmed in themselves, are associated with the Logos-name we cannot be here any more than in verse 1. The same applies to 1 Jno. 1:1–

understand them of the glorified human Saviour, the present tense of ὢν being explained from the standpoint of the Evangelist: "who is now again in the bosom of the Father." The latter view succeeds only very artificially in making Christ's return to the Father a ground of his ability to declare the Father during his *earthly* life, for to that the Aorist ἐξηγήσατο refers. Zahn's explanation is, that the return to the bosom of the Father has set the seal of God's approval upon Christ's work and so assures us that He has adequately declared God while on earth.

³² Notice the change from the simple ζωή to ἡ ζωή in the second clause.

3. It is here obvious again that the Λόγος τῆς ζωῆς, also called the Ζωή, comes in the character of a revelation, for He is the object of “hearing”, “seeing”, “handling”, “declaring”. All the same, that these things are by the author found expressed in the Logos-name is a matter of inference rather than of direct positive statement. In regard to “the life” which is said to have been manifested, no one draws the inference that the idea of manifestation is analytically contained in that of life. The third context where the Logos-names occur in the Johannine writings is Rev. 19:11–16. Here Zahn argues for the restriction to a functional significance in the sphere of revelation, from the contrast between the name which no one knows but the Christ Himself, verse 12, and the name wherewith He has come to be designated (κέκληται perf. tense), viz. “the Logos of God”. This contrast would seem to assign the Logos-name to the revealed, soteriological province of the Saviour’s life and mark it as inapplicable to the esoteric, unknowable side of His existence within the Godhead, which can be apprehended by Himself alone. It seems to us doubtful whether the contrast between the unknowable and the knowable in Christ here signaled by the distinction of these two names, coincides with the contrast between the life of Christ as related to God and his function as related to redemption. No one claims that the Logos-name in its ontological application is exhaustively descriptive of what Christ is in Himself as God with God. Even so it is a name in which the divine mode of existence has been brought near to the level of our human capacity of apprehension. Given its full trinitarian profundity of meaning, it still is not the name “which no one knows but He Himself”. This being so there is no reason to infer from the representation that the Logos-title can have nothing to do with the mysteries of the immanent life of the Godhead.³³

In view of the inferential character of the conclusions obtained from our reading of the Prologue itself, the question, whether parallel representations outside of the Prologue can throw any light on the possibility or probability of an ontological or ontogenetic use of the Logos-name, acquires additional interest. This is the fourth question above formulated and we now proceed briefly to look into it. It has begun to be recognized of late that at the time of the writing of our Gospel the Logos-name had a wider currency in philosophical and religious parlance than was previously supposed. The exclusive dependence of the Prologue on Philo is no longer advocated, even where a direct connection between his Logos-speculation and the Logos-doctrine of the Evangelist is insisted upon.³⁴ It is not the purpose of this paper to enquire into the extra-biblical emergence of the Logos-idea nor to discuss to what extent, if any, it may have exerted an influence upon the thought of the Prologue, either positively by contributing to its formative elements, or negatively by way of soliciting protest or correction from the Evangelist. The only point that at present concerns us is whether in these parallels, earlier or contemporary, the Logos-idea or related ideas are turned to ontological account or have a purely functional, cosmical reference.³⁵ In certain instances the presence of ontological speculation cannot be denied. The hypostatical beings of the Persian religion which occur in the Gathas and bear the name of Amesha Spentas were certainly

³³ Krebs, *Freiburger theol. Stud.* 1910, II, p. 115 observes that at any rate the restriction of the Logos-name to the soteriological sphere, to the exclusion of all wider cosmical significance is contraindicated by the context of Rev. 19:11–16. If the Logos is the creative power and wisdom of God, if the world is in virtue of this his own, then it becomes easily explainable, that He who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords should also be called the Logos of God.

³⁴ Cpr. Holtzmann-Bauer, *Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 50–58.

³⁵ The following account of the extra-biblical parallels is in part dependent on Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert* (*Freib. theol. Stud.* 1910) I, *Logos-Spekulation und Erlösungslehre im Heidentum des ersten Jahrhunderts*, pp. 21–75.

known in the first century of our era, whatever may be thought of the controversy between scholars as to their much higher antiquity, and as to the chronological possibility or non-possibility of making them the prototype of the Jewish archangels, or of making one of their number, Spenta-Armaiti, the prototype of the Jewish Chokma-hypostasis.³⁶ Among these Amesha Spentas there is one who bears a remote resemblance to the Logos-conception, viz. Vohu-Manô “the good thought”. While Vohu-Manô appears as the counsellor of Mazda in regard to the creation of the world, i.e., in a functional capacity, he is also represented as the Son of Mazda. Mazda is called “la matrice de Vohu-Manô”; he lives with Vohu-Manô “in one house”.³⁷

In the Babylonian-Assyrian religion Marduk appears as the possessor and dispenser of wisdom, the coequal Son of Ea, the primordial wisdom. He figures also as the Creator of the world, but it is not clear that there is a close connection between his wisdom-character and his birth from Ea on the one hand, or between his wisdom-character and his creative function on the other hand. As a wisdom-God he is immanent in the world; the whole construction rests on the basis of a pantheistic naturalism, which obliterates all distinction between what applies to the Godhead in itself and what pertains to its relation to the world. The same must be remembered when in certain Assyrian-Babylonian hymns the Word of a God appears personified. And that much of these ideas of older date survived as a living religious reality in the first century of our era is not probable.³⁸

A much closer analogy is afforded by the ancient Egyptian religion. This religion has in its doctrine of the gods certain constantly recurring features, one of these being “that a god engenders his son, or, strictly speaking, his double, through his mouth, through speaking, and that the activity and manner of working of the gods in general are accomplished by means of that powerful word”.³⁹ Preeminently this is predicated of the God Tauth or Tot. In a text from the Ptolemaic period this god is addressed as follows: “Tauth, thou hast cast forth Schu from thy mouth,—he proceeded from the tip of thy mouth—thy lips cast him forth”.⁴⁰ But the idea is much older. In an inscription of the eighth century B.C. Tot himself is called “the tongue, the image of Atum”. Of Atum it is said that “from every god’s body and every god’s mouth” he produces his own being. “All men, all cattle, all reptiles live, in virtue of his thinking and uttering whatever he wills.” Tot is the mouth “which has pronounced the name of everything” (and so created it).⁴¹ Striking as, from a formal point of view, the resemblance is of this to the ontological version of the Johannine Logos-idea, the great material difference in two respects ought not to be overlooked. In the first place the substratum of this whole representation is pantheism; the producing of another god, which is equivalent to the production of self, and the production of the content of the world are not

³⁶ In favor of the later date of the Avesta, Darmesteter, *Le Zendavesta* (*Musée Guimet* XXI, XXII, XXIV), and lately Lagrange, *La religion des Perses* (*Revue biblique internationale*, 1904). In favor of the older date Bousset, *Religion des Judenthums*,² pp. 591 ff.; Mills, *Zoroaster Philo and Israel*; Carnoy, *Religion of the Avesta*.

³⁷ In Darmesteter’s translation, Yasna 21, 8; 44, 9; 47, 3.

³⁸ Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 96, 243, 428 ff.; 548: “Marduk ... is commonly designated as the son of Ea ... the sun rising out of the ocean—the domain of Ea—was a factor in this association.”

³⁹ Krebs, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴⁰ Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*, pp. 53, 83; cpr. also Brugsch, *Rel. der Ägypter*, pp. 427–429 and Wiedemann, *Die Rel. det alten Ägypter*, p. 73, both cited by Krebs, p. 122.

⁴¹ Krebs, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

separated. And secondly from a generation *per modum intellectus* the process thus described is far removed. It is not idealistically but quite realistically conceived, as a veritable birth or ejection from the mouth, both the engendering and the engendered deity being materialistically conceived of.

This old Egyptian theology has of late been brought into the closest proximity to and connection with the Johannine Logos-teaching through its assumed combination with the cult of Hermes as Logos, first in Egypt, and then spreading from there over the Hellenistic world, about the beginning of the Christian era. Reitzenstein in his two works entitled “*Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*” (1901) and “*Poimandres*” (1904) has endeavored to establish the dependence of the Prologue on the Hermetic literature in its older form.⁴² The Stoics made Hermes the “Word” of Zeus. This Stoic Logos coalesced in Egypt with the old Egyptian Tot as early as the time of Alexander the Great. Reitzenstein thinks it can be made probable that the peculiar forms which this syncretistic Logos-theology shows in the Hermetic corpus and in some later pieces were current much earlier than the date of these writings, in fact that already in the Ptolomaeic age a Hermetic religion with Hermetic writings existed in which these peculiar views were embodied. The statements coming under consideration for our present purpose are mainly the following. In the *Poimandres* proper, the first of the eighteen pieces belonging to the collection passing under that same name, a theogony and cosmogony in one are described. The highest divine being is the Nous, the primordial light (identical with the *Poimandres* who gives the revelation). Out of the Nous the ἅγιος Λόγος proceeds, and subsequently the Nous, Demiourgos, still later the Anthropos αὐτῷ ἴσος, ἴδιος τόκος. All these three emanations engage in creative activity. Particularly the Logos on first coming forth from the Ur-light separates the elements of fire and air, but remains entangled in the as yet unseparated water and earth. Afterwards when the Demiourgos Nous has created the seven spirits of the spheres, the Logos leaps upward from the lower elements and unites himself with the Demiurge, the two henceforth forming a sort of Homousia. Here accordingly we have a Logos and a Nous, both sons of the Ur-light, flashed forth from the supreme Nous and remaining in a certain relation to him as well as entering upon a close relation to each other.⁴³ In

⁴² Cpr. also from the same author “*Hellenistische Theologie in Ägypten*” in Ilberg’s *Neues Jahrbuch für klassisches Alterthum*, 1904 (a compact summary of his views) and *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen*, 1910. A thoroughgoing critique of Reitzenstein’s theories is given by Krebs as an appendix to his study on *Der Logos als Heiland* in the *Freib. theol. Stud.* 1910, pp. 119–172. Cpr. also Zielinski, *Hermes und die Hermetik* in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1905, pp. 321–372 and 1906, pp. 25–60; *Theol. Literaturz.* 1911, col. 20–24.

⁴³ Reitzenstein thinks the peculiar situation in the *Poimandres* can only be explained from dependence on the old Ptah-theology of Memphis. In an inscription of the VIIIth Century B.C. Ptah is represented as the heart (= nous) and tongue (= logos) of the gods. At the same time Horos and Tot (who together = Ptah) are represented as the heart and tongue of Atum respectively. It ought to be observed, however, that others deny every connection of the *Poimandres* theogony with this ancient Egyptian speculation. So Zielinski, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, 1906, pp. 27–29. The representation in the *Poimandres* is held to be composite even after the elimination of the NeoPlatonic elements, which Reitzenstein himself recognizes, by Bousset, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1906, p. 697, and Dibelius, *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1905, pp. 178–183. If it is composite, the above combination loses much of its ontological significance.

another piece of the Hermetic collection, entitled the Τέλειος Λόγος, the Logos likewise appears as the Son of God, and at the same time as the supernatural being produced in man in the new birth, so that here the ontological and the soteriological conceptions are combined. In what Reitzenstein calls the “Strassburg Cosmogony”, the following representation of the Supreme God occurs: “Having drawn off from himself a certain portion of his manifold power (= Logos-Hermes) ... he charged him to fashion the all-beautiful world”.⁴⁴ In the same work Reitzenstein also discusses an Ave-Maria text preserved on an ostrakon of the VIth century.⁴⁵ In this text the words “thou shalt conceive” are lacking. He interprets this as implying that the conception has already taken place, viz. at that very moment through the Angel’s speaking unto the Virgin. Reitzenstein ventures to regard this as the original version of the nativity-story, older than the present synoptical account, and brings it into connection with Gnostic texts in which it is the Logos-Gabriel who makes the annunciation to Mary.⁴⁶ This would furnish an instance of the Logos-ontology—brought into connection with the incarnation of Jesus, in the peculiar form of the Logos himself creating *per modum verbi* in the Virgin his own human nature, and uniting Himself with the same.⁴⁷

The value of these Hermetic speculations for throwing light upon the Prologue is greatly diminished by the fact that their pre-Johannine currency or even their contemporaneousness with the origin of the Gospel cannot be established. Reitzenstein dates the Poimandres-corpus from the time of Diocletian. The correctness of this dating is disputed by others. But, apart from that, the grounds on which he believes that the substance of the Hermetic ideas, as embodied in a more primitive form of the first document (the Poimandres proper), can be carried back into the first century of the Christian era or earlier are very precarious. His main reliance is the alleged dependence of the fifth vision of the Shepherd of Hermas on the vision with which the Poimandres opens. Dibelius and Krebs have shown how weak this position is, and how easily the relation between the two documents may be reversed and the Poimandres made dependent on the

⁴⁴ So *Zwei religionsgesch. Fragen*, p. 53. Later on in the same piece Logos is the son of Hermes, p. 56.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 113–131.

⁴⁶ On this view, as Reitzenstein suggests, the Logos-doctrine of the Prologue would not so much be a different conception substituted for the original synoptical one, but a direct development out of the older synoptical version. Attention is called to the fact that as late writers as Ephraim Syr. and John of Damascus speak of Mary having conceived through the ear, Krebs, p. 154, note 6.

⁴⁷ Hence in a sermon by Pseudo-Athanasius appeal is made in refutation of the above error to the statement of Lk. 1:38 “And the angel departed from her”; if he departed this proves that he was not the Logos-Angel abiding in her united to his own human nature.

The conception of the Logos as producing his own human nature in the Virgin is already found in Justin Martyr, *Apol. I*, 33. Cpr. Cramer in *Zeitsch. f. Neut. Wiss.*, 1901, p. 314. Here, however, the Logos is not identified with the speaking angel, but only with the δύναμις Ὑψίστου of which the angel speaks, cpr. Veil, *Justins des Philosophen und Märtyrer’s Rechtfertigung*, 1894, pp. 70, 71. Cramer qualifies the representation that the preëxistent Christ begat the historical Christ, a “*haarsträubende Vorstellung*” and seeks to eliminate it from Justin by excision. But there is nothing extraordinary in it from Justin’s premises.

Shepherd.⁴⁸ As to the “Strassburg cosmogony”, the papyrus on which this is preserved is from the IVth century, the ostrakon containing the peculiar Ave-Maria text is of the VIth century after Christ. Reitzenstein’s efforts to bridge over the gulf between this late date and the earlier period and to make plausible the existence of a Hermetic religion with Hermetic writings as early as the Ptolemaic age are exceedingly unconvincing. If the speculations in question are of later origin they fall in line with the Gnostic teachings of a similar nature, particularly the Valentinian gnosis, and lose all significance for the illustration of the meaning of the Prologue.

It should be observed that Reitzenstein himself does not put an ontological or ontogenetic interpretation upon the Logos-name as used by John. In his view the Johannine Logos is nothing but the divine word of revelation. The dependence of the Gospel, so far as the Logos-conception is concerned, on the Hermetic belief would thus be reduced to that popular aspect of the latter which makes Hermes the Logos, the Revealer. The emanation-mythology would not have cast its reflex in the Prologue. The other respects in which according to Reitzenstein the peculiar modes of thought and formulas of expression of the Hermetic mysticism have influenced the Fourth Gospel do not concern us here.⁴⁹

From Philo, whose Logos-doctrine has been so often made the proximate source of the Johannine conception, we can see how germane ontological and ontogenetic questions were to the idea. The use made of it by Philo was not in itself favorable to the raising of such problems. In fact every precise formulation and definite solution in connection with them threatened to interfere with the main use the Logos-conception subserved in the system of the Alexandrian philosopher. If none the less we find Philo raising these questions and framing an answer to them which at least preserves the semblance of an ontology of the Logos, this is convincing evidence that the idea could scarcely be thought without this. The Philonic Logos serves to effect that converse and interaction between God and the world which the transcendence of God renders it impossible for Him to maintain directly. But this requires from the outset a certain indefiniteness and ambiguity in the conception formed of his nature, provenience and position. If the Logos were made truly divine, the difficulty of bringing him into touch with the world would be quite as great as in the case of God. On the other hand, if he were sharply separated from the divine nature the same difficulty would arise at the other end, viz. as to how the Logos could be in close touch with God; by his own distinctness from God he would only accentuate the separateness between God and the creature. Hence the Logos oscillates between God and the world; he is δεύτερος θεός, μεθόριος, μεθόριος φύσις, is called God ἐν καταχρήσει only, is neither ἀγένητος ὡς θεός nor γένητος ὡς ὑμεῖς, but ἀμφοτέροις ὀμηρεύων.⁵⁰ But the uncertainty in the point of nature carries with it the same kind of indefiniteness as regards personality, for the definite and positive conception of the Logos as hypostatical would have forced the issue between his subsumption under the divine or under the created.⁵¹ Here the Platonic and Stoic strands in Philo’s philosophy came to the aid of

⁴⁸ Dibelius in *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.* 1905, pp. 175 ff.; Krebs *op. cit.*, pp. 137–142. According to Granger, *Journal of Theolog. Studies*, 1904, the word Poimandres does not even mean “shepherd”, but “witness”, being taken from the Coptic, in which he assumes the treatise to have been originally composed.

⁴⁹ Cpr. Krebs, *op. cit.*, under the heading *Poimandres und Johannes*, pp. 157–172.

⁵⁰ Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* VII, 13; II, 652 Mangey; *Quis rer. div. her.*, 42; III, 47 Cohn-Wendland; *Somn.* I, 39; III, 253 CW; II, 28; III, 289 C W.

⁵¹ In favor of the personality Heinze, *Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 291–294. The question is unanswered and unanswerable according to Zeller, *Die Phil. der Griechen*, III, 2³, p. 378;

his interest in upholding the transcendence of God consistently with God's operation in the world. By conceiving the Logos as the Platonic world of ideas, not, however, as something distinct from God, but as the image of the world objective to God in God's own mind, and at the same time conceiving of him after the Stoic fashion as efficient and operative in the world, a representation was found which, in semblance at least, satisfies the requirements of the problem. The Logos in this conception is God, something in God, and yet distinct from God, something ideally objective to the mind of God. To be sure the problem is only solved in appearance, not in reality, for in the question how the Platonic ideas, which to Philo form a part of God's life, can at the same time operate upon the world as the Stoic Logos, it reëmerges in all its former acuteness. It will be perceived from the above that the Philonic Logos is in his very essence unthinkable apart from the world, in fact is the world as ideally present to the mind of God.⁵² Even those names of the Logos which at first sight might seem to give him a degree of immanent significance for God, on closer examination appear to have as their necessary correlate his significance for the world, and to be understandable from this point of view only. The Logos is *πρωτόγονος, πρεσβύτερος, πρεσβύτατος υἱός*, but he bears these names in his capacity of *κόσμος νοητός* with an implied side-reference to the *νεώτερος υἱός*, the visible world.⁵³ Now for the Logos thus conceived there was really no need of ontological or ontogenetic definition, since the conception itself defines his position with the Godhead. Notwithstanding this we find Philo not infrequently employing terms for the purpose of such definition, as if he felt that it would be unsatisfactory to speak of a Logos without seeking to define, after some fashion, his affiliation with and provenience from God. The Logos has for his father God, for his mother Wisdom.⁵⁴ The designation of him as *εἰκὼν θεοῦ* comes still nearer to the purpose, especially since it is coupled with the predicate *ὁ ἐγγυτάτω* "the one nearest to God", which has reminded some exegetes of Jno. 1:1 (*ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*).⁵⁵ And here we have something inherently expressed by the Logos-name itself; he is *εἰκὼν* because Logos, for the point of the figure in *εἰκὼν* lies in the co-spirituality of the Logos with God, and this co-spirituality belongs to him because he is the objective content of God's reason (= Logos).⁵⁶

Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, III³, p. 556; Reville, *La doctrine du Logos*, pp. 26, 29; against personality: Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, II, 223–273; Grill, *Unters. üb. d. Entsteh. des vierten Ev.* I, pp. 139–144.

⁵² Here the fundamental difference between Philo's Logos and the Logos of John can be most clearly perceived. The former creates and can create because he is not-God, John's Logos creates and can create because He is God.

⁵³ *Somn.* I, 37; III, 251 CW; *Conf. ling.* 14; II, 241 CW; 28; II, 257 CW; *Agric.* 12; II, 106 CW; *S. q. D. s. imm.* 6; II, 63 CW.

⁵⁴ *De prof.* 20; I, 562 M: *πατὴρ μὲν θεοῦ, ὃς καὶ τῶν συμπάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ, μητὴρ δὲ σοφίας, δι' ἧς τὰ ὅλα ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν.* Notice the side-reference to the world even here.

⁵⁵ *De prof.* 19; I, 561 M.

⁵⁶ Here again the fact should not be lost sight of that as *εἰκὼν* the Logos already postulates the world: *λόγος δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο.* Nevertheless the idea of closeness to God is undoubtedly present; Cpr. Grill, *Unters.* I, p. 107 "Mit dem Wesen des Logos als des Geistigsten ist es hienach gegeben, dass er das Abbild Gottes und als solches Gott am nächsten stehend ist. In der Vorstellung des *εἰκὼν* liegt also wesentlich das Moment der Unmittelbarkeit des Verhältnisses zu Gott, der engsten Zusammengehörigkeit mit ihm."

The same applies to the equation σκια θεοῦ ὁ λόγος,⁵⁷ or when the Logos is described as ἀνθήλιος ἀυγή in distinction from God the ἥλιος, or when God is called ἡ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου λόγου πηγή.⁵⁸ In all these cases the figures are but so many variations of the Logos-figure: what they affirm of the being of the Logos with God or of his provenience from God could be affirmed by means of the Logos-idea as truly, if not so graphically. And in all these cases we have a sort of ontology of the Logos, though it is kept throughout related to the world and is of a psychological, not of a strictly metaphysical, nature, Philo being prevented from indulging in the latter by the terms of his system. That the idea of the Logos required some such definition of being and provenience can be even more clearly observed when Philo comes to speak of the impartation of the Logos to the world and to man. “Every man is as to his understanding inhabited by a divine Logos being thus an impress (ἐκμαγεῖον), a detached portion (ἀπόσπασμα) or an effulgence (ἀπαύγασμα) of the blessed nature of God”.⁵⁹ The most realistic cosmogonic language is not shunned when the origin of the world from the demiurge as father and Episteme as mother is described in the following terms: ἧ̄ (scil. τῆ̄ ἐπιστήμη) συνὼν ὁ θεὸς οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἔσπειρε γένεσιν, ἡ δὲ παραδεξαμένη τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρματα τελεσφόροις ὠδίσι τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν υἱὸν ἀπεκύησε τόνδε τὸν κόσμον.⁶⁰ Though this is said of the birth of the visible world, the terms employed (the mother = Episteme = Sophia, and the title “Son”) mark it as the counterpart of the birth of the higher Logos in God.

From the foregoing it appears that there was that in the idea of the Logos which invited an ontological use of the conception. That Philo was unable to proceed beyond a mere psychological or metaphorical ontology was not due to the idea in itself, but to the peculiar nature and uncertain position of his Logos-subject. The situation would become quite different when a subject was given in regard to whose essential deity and true hypostatical character in the form of eternal divine sonship there existed no doubt. Such a subject was given in the Person of Jesus Christ. It is difficult to see how, once the Logos-concept was pressed into the service of the Christian doctrine concerning Christ as God, the inference could fail to be drawn for any length of time that the name was also adapted to express the mystery of the personal relation to and provenience of the Son from the Father. A presumption is thus created that the significant use of the Logos-name as a subject for ontological predicates in the opening sentences of the Prologue has already for its background a development in this direction in early Christian teaching. This is rendered all the more probable by the observation that in the case of analogous terms, which in Philo and Sap. Sol. had shared with the Logos-name and with Wisdom the cosmical reference, we can show how in the New Testament teaching their christological application is immediately accompanied by their enlistment in the service of ontology. Thus the term εἰκὼν θεοῦ occurs in Philo and in Sap. Sol. as a predicate of the Logos and of Wisdom. It expresses an inherent characteristic of both. Even so, however, it remains inseparable from the idea of the kosmos. Paul applies this term to Christ not merely in respect of his human nature in an eschatological sense (Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18) but also in respect of his deity in a trinitarian sense. Christ is ὑπάρχων εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ

⁵⁷ *Leg. alleg.* III, 31; I, 134 CW.

⁵⁸ *Qu. det. pot. ins.* 22; I, 277 CW.

⁵⁹ *De Opif. Mundi*, 51.

⁶⁰ *De ebriet.* 31; II, 176 CW. Reitzenstein (*Poimandres*, p. 41) finds in this the influence of Egyptian mythology. Cpr. also (*ibid.*) the Platonizing representation of Plutarch (*De Is. et Osir.* 53–54) clothed in the forms of the Egyptian myth of Osiris-Isis, Horos-Typhon. Here also there are two Logoi, Osiris = κόσμος νοητός, Horos = κόσμος αἰσθητός.

1 Cor. 11:7; 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου⁶¹, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως. In this last passage the πρωτότοκος shows that the figure of the εἰκὼν has already connected with it in Paul's mind the idea of provenience; Christ is the εἰκὼν of the invisible God not merely in respect of similarity to God, but specifically in respect of similarity due to derivation; the εἰκὼν not only resembles, it is drawn off from the prototype.⁶² Even more clearly the observation can be made in regard to Heb. 1:3. Here Christ is described as ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως (τοῦ θεοῦ). The words characterize Him not as the God-man, but as to his preëxistent deity, for they are brought into connection with his mediatorial activity in creating the world and in providence.⁶³ Both terms are found in Philo of the Logos, the former also in Sap. Sol. of "Wisdom";⁶⁴ they have here a cosmical reference: the soul is stamped with the seal of God, of which seal the eternal Logos is the χαρακτήρ; every man is inhabited by the divine Logos, being thus an ἀπαύγασμα of the nature of God; Wisdom is an effulgence from everlasting light. There is little doubt to our mind that the writer of Hebrews, while not excluding the cosmical use of the figures, means to have them understood in an ontological sense. He does not say that the son in creating carries the δόξα of God into the world, and stamps the world with the χαρακτήρ of God, but that in his own Person He *is* the ἀπαύγασμα and *bears* the χαρακτήρ of God. Ἀπαύγασμα is a passive form and therefore represents the Son not so much as an active instrument but rather as the passive product of the ἀπανγάζειν. As to ὑπόστασις (here = "substance" not = "person"), this seems scarcely capable of being communicated to the world, while of the Son in Himself it can be appropriately said that the divine substance is expressed in Him.⁶⁵ We see no reason, therefore, for abandoning the ontological interpretation which has prevailed without dissent from the time of the early Greek commentators, till a comparatively recent date.⁶⁶ If it is correct, we have in this passage a striking instance of the early ontogenetic use made of terms previously employed in cosmical relations. What happened to εἰκὼν, ἀπαύγασμα and χαρακτήρ may well have happened to λόγος.

A few words may be devoted to the hypostatical conception of "Wisdom" in its bearing on the problem in hand. There is difference of opinion among scholars as to the precise point where poetic personification passes over into hypostasizing. Those who fix a late date for the composition of Proverbs and Job and explain the peculiar form assumed by the idea of Wisdom in these writings from the influence of Persian religion or of Greek philosophy, will naturally incline towards finding a Wisdom-hypostasis even here, whilst the advocates of an earlier date as a rule favor the

⁶¹ The point of the statement is not that the visible, incarnate Christ is the image of the invisible God, but that the divine Christ, precisely because He is invisible, spiritual Himself, reproduces God in this respect. It is as εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ that He functioned in the creation of all things.

⁶² This on the supposition that πρωτότοκος is not a mere figure for precedence, but looks to the origin of Christ, in other words that the -τοκος has its own significance.

⁶³ Notice the particle τε in the following clause φέρων τε τὰ πάντα, which derives Christ's function in providence from his being the ἀπαύγασμα and χαρακτήρ of God.

⁶⁴ *De Opif. Mundi*, 51; I, 51 CW; *De Plantat. Noë*, 5; II, 137 CW; *Leg. alleg.* III, 96; I, 106 M; *Sap. Sol.* 7:26.

⁶⁵ It will be observed that on the view above favored χαρακτήρ must be given the passive sense of ὁ ἐστι κεχαραγμένον. The other view requires the active sense of ὁ χαράσσει.

⁶⁶ Of late the cosmical reference of the figures has been advocated by von Soden, in Holtzmann's *Handkommentar*², III, 2, p. 19. Bruce regards it as possible. *The Ep. to the Hebrews*, pp. 37 ff.

theory of mere personification.⁶⁷ Difference of opinion exists also in regard to Sirach, but that in Sapiientia Solomonis Wisdom appears as a fully-developed hypostatical being is generally recognized.⁶⁸ It is not necessary to enter into this question here. Although to the writers of Job and Proverbs, or even of Sirach, Wisdom might not have come to be more than a divine attribute personified, nevertheless when later the hypostatical character of this Wisdom became an object of belief and reflection, the descriptions given of it and the predicates joined to it in the earlier period, would inevitably, in the light of this new doctrinal apperception, acquire a new significance. What had been said about Wisdom as an attribute might already, it was felt, have carried intimations about Wisdom as an hypostasis and in this view could be transferred from the one to the other. And in many cases the hypostatical interpretation would undoubtedly be read back as an *explicitum* into the earlier documents, where an exegesis guided by finer historical sense would say that at most it could be only hinted at and foreshadowed. Now it is of importance to observe, that in all the sources, canonical and extra-canonical, where this figure of Wisdom emerges certain significant statements concerning its origin and mode of existence with God are made.⁶⁹ These statements would, on the supposition of the personifying nature of the description, be only so many allegorical details in the general poetic picture. Like the whole picture, however, they would immediately become invested with a new and most profound significance, where the attribute had been recognized as veiling an hypostasis. Instead of being taken as mere poetic embellishments, they would be inevitably seized upon as pointing to important ontological and ontogenetic verities. In view of this it will be worth while to gather and compare the statements referred to. In Prov. 8:22 ff. Wisdom speaks of herself: “Jehovah formed me (other rendering “possessed me”) in the beginning of His way,⁷⁰ before His works of old. I was set up (or “formed” or “anointed”) from everlasting, from the beginning, before the earth was ... before the hills was I brought forth ... when He established the heavens I was there ... then I was with Him as a masterworkman (other rendering “as one brought up”⁷¹), and I was daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him, rejoicing in His habitable earth, and my delight was with the sons of men.” In Job. 28 after the contrast between human wisdom and the divine Wisdom has been pointed out in verses 1–11 and 12–22⁷² the poet continues to describe the presence of Wisdom with God at the

⁶⁷ Cpr. Friedländer, *Griechische Philosophie im Alten Testament*, 1904.

⁶⁸ Heinisch, *Die Griech. Philos. im Buche der Weisheit* denies that Wisdom is in Sap. Sol. a “Mittelwesen” as in Philo, i.e. that wisdom performs a function which God could not perform, but does not deny the hypostatical character of the conception (pp. 126–136 in *Alttest. Abh.* I).

⁶⁹ An exception must be made for Baruch 3:9–4:4 where in the picture of Wisdom nothing of this nature occurs.

⁷⁰ Frankenberg in Nowack’s *Handkommentar*, reads “als Erstling seiner Schöpfung”. But ראשית seems to point to Gen. 1:1.

⁷¹ Frankenberg rejects “masterworkman” and renders “unter seiner Obhut” on the ground that מְשֹׁנְעִים and מְשֹׁנְעֵי אֱלֹהִים, as figures of childlike deportment, are inapplicable to the high creative function. But cpr. Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.* p. 123 note 1. “Chokma, die in Prov. 8 dem Schöpfer die bunten Arten der Geschöpfe vorspielt ehe er sie schafft.”

⁷² Merx, *Hiob* p. XLII thinks that in Job there is an implied protest against the idea of wisdom as worked out by Proverbs. The latter preaches in the public places, while in Job wisdom is represented as hidden from the eyes of all the living. But this overlooks the distinction between

time of creation in the following terms: “Then did He see it and declare it; He established it, yea, and searched it out” (verse 27). Sirach employs similar language. In 1:1–10 it is said of Wisdom: she “comes from the Lord and is with Him forever ... the days of eternity who shall number?... and Wisdom who shall search out?... Wisdom has been created before all things, and the understanding of prudence from everlasting ... the Lord sitting upon his throne: He created her, and saw and numbered her, and poured her out upon all His works.” And in 24. Wisdom praises herself as follows: “I came forth from the mouth of the Most High ... I dwelt in high places ... and in every people and nation I got a possession ... with all these I sought rest ... then the Creator of all things ... said, Let thy tabernacle be in Jacob and thine inheritance in Israel. He created me from the beginning before the world; and to the end I shall not fail. In the holy tabernacle I ministered before Him and so was I established in Zion” (vss. 1–10⁷³). Perhaps the most striking statements are found in Sap. Sol. 7:22–27. Here Solomon is introduced speaking about Wisdom: “She that is the artificer of all things taught me ... for there is in her (other reading: “she is”) a spirit quick of understanding, holy, alone in kind (monogenes), manifold, subtle, freely moving, clear in utterance, unpolluted, distinct, unharmed, loving what is good, keen, unhindered, beneficent, loving toward man, steadfast, sure, free from care, all-powerful, all-surveying, and penetrating through all spirits ... Wisdom is more mobile than any motion; yea she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness. For she is a breath (ἀτμίς) of the power of God, and a clear effluence (ἀπόρροια) of the glory of the Almighty ... an effluence (ἀπαύγασμα) from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image (εἰκόν) of His goodness. And she, being one, hath power to do all things; and remaining in herself, reneweth all things. And from generation to generation passing into holy souls she maketh men friends of God and prophets.” And in 8:3, 4: “She glorifieth her noble birth in that it is given her to live with God, and the sovereign Lord of all loved her, for she is initiated into the knowledge of God and she chooseth out for Him His works ... an artificer of the things that are”. According to 9:4, 10 she sits by God on his throne.⁷⁴

It would be unreasonable to expect in this wisdom-literature the precise and carefully-guarded definitions and distinctions of the later church-theology. Certain things are said of Wisdom, which it might be difficult to incorporate into the scientifically formulated doctrine of the deity of Christ and the Trinity. Instead of wondering at this we ought rather to be surprised at the extent to which on the whole the wisdom-conception fits into the subsequent revelation concerning the Person of our Lord and His place within the Godhead. To be particularly noticed, however, for our present purpose is the fact that this rich elaboration which the idea of Wisdom had received at the hand of Old Testament revelation and Jewish theology, could not fail to influence the development of the

human and divine wisdom. The latter is a hidden wisdom in Proverbs also (8:22–33) cpr. Friedländer, *Griech. Phil. im Alt. Test.* p. 122.

⁷³ Friedländer would find in this definite location of Wisdom in Israel and Zion, implying its identification with the law, a particularistic and legalistic departure from the Wisdom-teaching of Proverbs. *Op. cit.*, p. 166. This is hardly just to Sir., for according to 1:9, 10 Wisdom is in his view, no less than that of Proverbs, poured out upon God’s works and found with all flesh according to his gift. Even the context of 24:8 ff. does not fail to state that Wisdom has gotten a possession in every people and nation.

⁷⁴ In Enoch xlii. 1, 2 Wisdom also is hypostatically conceived: not finding place among mankind, she returns to her place and takes her abode among the angels. According to 2 Enoch xxx. 8 God commanded Wisdom to create man.

Logos-doctrine. That Wisdom and the Logos were closely-allied conceptions, and that many features originally pertaining to the former were subsequently transferred to the latter admits of no doubt. Even some of the earliest descriptions invited this. The representation that Jehovah “declared” Wisdom (Job 28:27), that she came forth from the mouth of the Most High (Sir. 24:3) seems to make her procession from God resemble that of the Word. With this agrees the later statement of Sap. Sol. that she is a breath of the power of God (7:25). The circumstance that both Wisdom and the Word have a mediatorial function in creation and providence would also facilitate such an interchange of attributes and predicates. But it can also be shown à posteriori that Wisdom and the Logos were identified. In Sap. Sol. 9:1 we read that God is ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ to which is added καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ σου κατεσκεύασας ἄνθρωπον. The Logos is characterized in 16:12 as ὁ πάντα ἰόμενος, a soteriological character elsewhere ascribed to Wisdom, 10:1, 4, 6, 9, 15; 11:1 ff. That in Philo Wisdom and the Logos (= Reason) are practically identical has been shown above. Philo appeals to Prov. 8:22 where he represents the Logos as the child of God and Wisdom.⁷⁵ There is reason to believe that the hypostatical Wisdom was recognized by the inspired writers of the New Testament as embodied in Christ, and that consequently in their circle also the Logos-conception of Christ could easily borrow traits from the Wisdom-Doctrine.⁷⁶ As a matter of fact the Prologue itself contains some traces of this mutual fructification which the Wisdom and the Logos-conception received from each other. The ἐν ἀρχῇ of Jno. 1:1, while pointing back to Gen. 1:1, probably also alludes to Prov. 8:23 πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐθεμελίωσέ με ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ποιῆσαι.⁷⁷ The description of the Logos as a mediator in creation in verse 3 may well have the same double background of the creative word in Gen. 1 and elsewhere in the Old Testament, and the creative Wisdom in Prov. 8 and other passages of the Wisdom-literature. The idea of a tabernacling of the Logos in verse 14 has a striking parallel in the use of the same figure with reference to Wisdom taking up its abode among Israel.⁷⁸ The close association between Logos and light in the Prologue likewise favors the view that the wisdom-teaching was one of the contributory sources to John’s teaching on this subject. The occurrence of the pleroma-conception in the Prologue on the one hand as associated with the Logos, in Ephesians and Colossians on the other hand as associated with the Wisdom in Christ, perhaps also points to an inner connection between the two ideas.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ *De ebriet.* 31; II, 176 CW; Friedländer, *Der vorchristliche jüd. Gnostizismus*, p. 54; *Griech. Phil. im Alt. Test.*, p. 86.

⁷⁶ Cpr. Mt. 11:19; Lk. 7:35; 11:49; 1 Cor. 1:24, 30; 2:7, 8; 2 Cor. 2:14; 4:4; Col. 2:3. Krebs, pp. 81–93 seems to assume that the whole teaching of Ephesians and Colossians with its emphasis on knowledge and wisdom rests on the background of the identification of Christ with Wisdom. This would be difficult to prove.

⁷⁷ Similarly 1 Jno. 1:1 ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς seems to point back to Sir. 24:9 and Rev. 3:14 ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ may have its precedent in Prov. 8:22 κύριος ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ. Bugge, *Das Gesetz und Christus*, *Zeitsch. f. N. T. Wiss.* 1903, pp. 89 ff. thinks that the equation of Logos with Wisdom is but one instance of the general identification of Christ with the hypostatical Thora.

⁷⁸ Sir. 24:8; Bar. 3:37.

⁷⁹ The Fourth Gospel does not make explicit use of the conception of “Wisdom”. It has been suggested by Grill (*Untersuch.* I, pp. 199–201) that this is due to a conscious avoidance of the term on the part of the Evangelist occasioned by the abuse made of it in Gnostic speculation.

In view of the foregoing it does not seem unreasonable to assume that part of the ontological and ontogenetic associations with which the conception of Wisdom was so richly invested from the beginning came to attach to the Logos-name. Some have found in the ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν of Jno. 1:1 a direct reference to Prov. 8:27 συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ.⁸⁰ But whether any weight be attached to this detail-point or not, at any rate the belief that the Logos-name from its earliest use in Christian circles carried with it a certain ontological flavor, has a high degree of plausibility.

In the next place we cast a glance at the Memra-doctrine of the Jewish Theology. If a hypostatical “Word” was known to this previously to the date of the Fourth Gospel, this would have an important bearing on the problem of the ontogenetic use of the conception in John. For the “word” is so plainly a product of the divine act of speaking, that once being hypostatized it can scarcely fail to share as a hypostasis in this dependence on God for its origin, conceived after the manner of speaking. Unfortunately it is impossible to tell how old this Jewish conception of a hypostatical Memra is. In the Targum of Onkelos there occurs frequently the phrase “Memra of Jehovah” side by side with two other phrases “Shekhinta of Jehovah” and “Jekara of Jehovah”. These phrases do not, according to Dalman,⁸¹ designate hypostatical entities distinct from God, but are used as circumlocutions, where the Old Testament predicates anthropomorphisms of the Deity, in order that these may no longer appear directly combined with Jehovah. To a limited extent these same phrases seem to have come into use outside of the stated Targum-address. The next step in the development of the usage seems to have been that “Memra of Jehovah” was no longer confined to anthropomorphic contexts, but became a reverential designation of God in general.⁸² But even here it would be difficult to stop. The frequent substitution of Memra for God would naturally tend towards hypostasizing. In a certain passage⁸³ it is said that at the promulgation of the law the Dibbur proceeded from the mouth of God, went to every Israelite in the camp, asked him whether he was willing to receive it, and kissed every one who agreed to do so on his mouth. This can hardly be explained on the basis of personification or reverential speech about God.⁸⁴ As

Sophia as one of the aeons played a prominent rôle in several of the Gnostic systems. She did not belong to the higher aeons, which came first in the self-unfolding of the divine being, but received her place among the later and latest emanations, so as to actually fall out of the pleroma into the hyle. Avoidance of the explicit name Sophia for the reason stated would not, of course, hinder, but rather promote the transferring of certain Wisdom-predicates to the Logos, and is therefore not inconsistent with the view that the Prologue looks back to the earlier Wisdom-teaching in its purer form.

⁸⁰ Cpr. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, II, p. 474.

⁸¹ *Die Worte Jesu*, I, p. 187. In later Targums is also found, instead of Memra, “Dibbera” or “Dibbüra of Jehovah.”

⁸² Cpr. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*,² p. 182. Weber does not clearly distinguish between a circumlocutory and an hypostatical Memra.

⁸³ Shir Rabba, I², quoted by Weber, p. 180.

⁸⁴ Against Dalman who would deny the real hypostasis cpr. Bousset, *Die Rel. des Judenth.*² p. 398, note 2. There is force also in the words of Hackspill (*Revue biblique internationale*), 1902, p. 62: “Peut-on dire que dans toutes ces locutions la Parole ne soit autre chose qu’un acte de Dieu, une manifestation de sa volonté ad extra? Si la parole est identique à l’être divin, pourquoi fait-on dire à Dieu “Ma Parole” quand on pouvait lui faire dire simplement “Moi”? pourquoi ce soin scrupuleux à faire agir la Parole comme intermédiaire entre Dieu et les

stated, however, we are not certain how early or late the circumlocutory use passed over into the hypostatical representation. Some would find the hypostasis as early as 4 Ezra 4:43 where it is said that “the Word” proceeds from God, as in the Targum. But the Old Testament likewise has this as a mere personification. We cannot even be certain that the circumlocutory use has influenced the Prologue. It has been claimed that such influence is traceable in Jno. 1:14, because here the three ideas of the Memra, the Shekhina and the Jekara occur together.⁸⁵ But it would be difficult to prove that there is anything in this verse that cannot be adequately explained from the Old Testament. The joint-occurrence of the three phrases is easily accounted for, since the Shekhina and the glory go naturally together, and the resumption of the term Logos as connected with the other two would be suggested to the Evangelist by his desire to emphasize the palpable presence and bodily manifestation of the Logos among men, since the Shekhina was the most substantial form of God’s real presence with his people under the old covenant.⁸⁶ We do not pass beyond the realm of possibilities in this matter.

The recently recovered “Odes of Solomon” would bear a conclusive witness to the early familiarity of Jewish circles with a hypostatical “Word”, if Harnack’s view in regard to the original Jewish provenience of the Odes (with later Christian interpolations) could be accepted.⁸⁷ They might render the same service on the hypothesis of Rendel Harris, the re-discoverer and editor of the Odes, who assigns them to a Jewish-Christian source and thinks that the elements regarded by Harnack as interpolations are original.⁸⁸ For a Jewish-Christian Logos-conception at so early a date might point back to the still earlier existence of the same in purely Jewish circles. In the existing uncertainty as to the dating of the Odes little reliance can be placed upon them for proving an early development of the Memra-doctrine.⁸⁹ But the Odes, altogether apart from this question, possess an interest in themselves on account of their relation to the Fourth Gospel in general and of their Logos-conception to the Johannine Logos in particular. Here, however, everything again depends on the date assigned to them. The lively discussions of the past three years have shown that the problems of provenience and date are yet far from ripe for a final decision.⁹⁰ If the Odes

hommes. A quoi bon choisir un intermédiaire apte a prévenir toute relation directe, si cet intermédiaire est identique à l’un des deux termes extrêmes, c’eat à Dieu? La fréquence du recours ... prouve ... que cette conception ... avait dû prendre une consistance plus que logique dans la réflexion religieuse juive.”

⁸⁵ So Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

⁸⁶ In Sir. 24:8–12, the Sophia and the Shekhina are brought into connection.

⁸⁷ Flemming und Harnack, *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert in Text. u. Unt.*, 1910, III, 5, 4. Harnack puts the Jewish author between 50 B.C. and 67 A.D., the interpolator about 100.

⁸⁸ *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*,² 1911.

⁸⁹ Clemen in *Theol. Rundschau*, 1911, pp. 18, 19, thinks that the repeated association in the Odes of the conceptions Logos-Light-Life is not to be explained from dependence of the Odes on the Fourth Gospel, but points back to certain early speculations on which both John and the Odes are equally dependent. According to Clemen the Odes are Christian; he does not say whether the speculations referred to were Jewish or early-Christian.

⁹⁰ Cpr. Harris’ *Brief Summary of Criticism* prefixed to the second edition of 1911. Since then several new contributions have been made to the subject from various quarters. With Harnack side: Menzies (*Interpr.* 1910), who thinks the Jewish origin can in certain cases be maintained

are gnostic and date from the middle of the second century or later, this, as Harris pointedly observes, sweeps away all references to a pre-Johannine school of thought and they can no longer be expected to throw light on the antecedents of the Johannine Logos-doctrine. Still it must be remembered that even on this supposition the Odes furnish an illustration of a very early and considerably developed use of the Logos-name, as well as of some other conceptions, which, together with the Logos-name, occur also in John. Whether this be dependent on John or not, in either case it is not too remote from the Johannine writings chronologically to claim for it considerable historical interest and importance. According to Harnack himself light is thrown by the Odes on the Fourth Gospel in a twofold respect. First in so far as the original Jewish document reveals a preformation of the Johannine type of piety and theology and secondly in so far as the work of the Christian interpolator bears features that are allied to the Johannine teaching. Whether or not the interpolator knew the Gospel Harnack does not venture positively to decide, although in certain instances he thinks it probable he did. But in the first respect the dependence of John is clear and pronounced; the Odes disclose to us the quarry from which the Johannine blocks were hewn. While this is unhesitatingly affirmed with reference to such conceptions as "light", "life", "truth", "knowledge", "faith", "love", "hope", "new birth", all of which the Evangelist simply

without resorting to the hypothesis of interpolation; Spitta (*Zeitsch. f. d. N. T. Wiss.* 1910; *Monatsch. f. Past. Theol.* 1910), whose dissection does not coincide, however, with Harnack's; Spitta believes Paul knew the Odes; as 4 Ezra illustrates Paul's state of mind before the conversion, so the Odes his state of mind after the conversion; he does not think it likely that either the writer or the redactor of the Fourth Gospel was influenced by the Odes; the interpolator probably drew from the Gospel; Staerk (*Zeitsch. f. wiss. Theol.* 1910), who adopts Harnack's view while rejecting his main arguments for Jewish origin drawn from alleged reference to the temple in Odes 4 and 6; Diettrich (*Die Reformation* 1910), who separates between an older Jewish stratum, and a younger Christian stratum, which latter he at first regarded as orthodox-Christian, subsequently as heretical-Christian. With Harris, though not accepting his arguments from the temple-references, sides Haussleiter (*Theol. Literaturbl.* 1910); the Odes presuppose the Fourth Gospel; in favor of Christian origin (not specifically Jewish-Christian): Zahn (*Neue Kirchl. Zeitsch.*, 1910), who believes that much can be explained from the view that the author impersonated Solomon and made Solomon speak not merely for his own person, but also for Christ in a typical capacity; the date approximately between 120 and 180 A.D.; the author knew Matthew, the Fourth Gospel, the Pauline Epistles, the Apocalypse; Bernard (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 1910), who makes the date about 150 A.D., perhaps later, and throws out the hypothesis that the Odes are baptismal songs; baptismal allusions are also found by Lake (*Theol. Tydsch.* 1911) and Diettrich (see above); Wellhausen (*Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1910): the Odes are Christian, probably dependent on the Fourth Gospel; Connolly, (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 1912) the Odes are Christian; not earlier than 150 A.D.; in favor of heretical origin: Gunkel (*Zeitsch. f. d. N. T. Wiss.* 1910): the production of a gnostic sect; probably Jewish-
gnostic; no dualism proper; Batiffol (*Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911) the work of a syncretist with gnostic-docetic leanings of the type opposed by Ignatius; agrees with Zahn in finding impersonation of Solomon; Preuschen (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1910) the work of Valentinus; Fries (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911) Montanistic effusions; Krebs (*Freib. Theol. Stud.* 1910) products of gnostic piety and poetry in the second century; the parallels from gnostic writings have been collected by Stölten (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1912).

borrowed from the early Jewish mystics, and back of all of which he simply placed his Christ,⁹¹ the matter is not quite so simple where the Logos-idea comes under consideration. Here Harnack fails to make a clear statement as to how he conceives of the relation between the Logos-conception reflected in the Odes and the Logos-doctrine in John. On the one hand it is emphasized repeatedly that the Logos-conception of the Odes shares with the other ideas enumerated in that there is nothing Hellenic about it.⁹² On the other hand Harnack seems still to uphold his old distinction between the body of the Fourth Gospel as practically free from Hellenic influence and the Prologue as explainable only from the intrusion of the Hellenic Logos-doctrine.⁹³ For he qualifies his statement that “in the Johannine theology there is nothing truly Hellenic” by excepting the Prologue.⁹⁴ Accordingly it would seem, since the Prologue is, according to Harnack, the only portion of the Gospel into which the Logos-idea enters, that as regards the Logos-conception the same close resemblance does not exist, which is supposed to exist between the Odes and the Gospel in the use of the other characteristic ideas. In all other respects the peculiarly Johannine trains of thought are now accounted for as Jewish-mystical and non-Hellenic, the Johannine Logos-doctrine alone cannot be so accounted for, because it is Hellenic, while the Logos-conception of the Odes is not. The alleged differences between the Prologue and the Gospel thus entail a corresponding difference in the point of dependence of both on the mysticism of the Odes. Now as many have been unable to follow Harnack in this discovery of a principal difference between the Logos-Christology of the Prologue and the Christology in the remainder of the Gospel, so we believe many will fail to see that the Prologue is in a different position as regards resemblance to the Odes from the other parts of the Gospel.⁹⁵ According to Harnack himself the “mystical complex” of the Odes comes very close to Hellenic-philosophic ideas, although not being quite equivalent to “Logos” in the sense of the latter, and although originated under quite different presuppositions. With such close resemblance between the two there is some room for scepticism as to the reality of a distinction which it requires considerable refinement to make perceptible.

The subject of the Logos-conception in the Odes is beset with great difficulty owing to the general obscureness of the Odes and because it is well-nigh impossible to retain within fixed moulds of conceptual thought the often vague and ever-fluctuating mystical effusions of the poet. In a work like this the line of division between abstract ideas or personifications and a real hypostasis is exceedingly hard to draw. So far as we are able to ascertain the outstanding facts are

⁹¹ The conceptions were originally un-Messianic. Harnack thinks that the Odes are “the intermediate link which enables us to connect a very important strand of late Jewish literature with the presuppositions of the piety and theology of John, without recourse to the synoptical, i.e., the historical Jesus Christ, and without the help of all Messianism”, Flemming-Harnack, pp. 99, 102.

⁹² *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalm.*, pp. 42, 11, 119.

⁹³ *Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1892, pp. 189–231.

⁹⁴ *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalm.* p. 119.

⁹⁵ Cpr. Strachan in *The Exp. Times*, xxii. p. 14 who makes this very point: “He (Harnack) regards these Odes as proving that in the Johannine theology, apart from the Prologue, there is nothing essentially Hellenic. It may, however, be added that, as regards the Prologue, one is very much struck with the fact that there is scarcely a single sentence in it, where some kind of parallel might not be deduced from these Odes.”

as follows.⁹⁶

The first reference to “the Word” occurs in Ode VII, 9 “The Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge.” In the preceding verses 4–8 the subject spoken of is the Lord Christ as condescending to the poet in the incarnation. If the subject remains the same, then Christ as “the Word” is here called “the Father of knowledge”, probably in the sense of the source of knowledge. This is favored by the content of verses 10–13 which speak of the poet’s creation by him who is the Word, the Father of knowledge and also reintroduce the note of condescension. If this interpretation be adopted a new subject will appear in verse 14 “He has given him to be seen of them that are his, in order that they may recognize Him that made them”, for here God is the one spoken of as giving Christ to be seen. Some interpreters, however, think that not verse 14 but verse 9 is the place where the subject changes. In that case “the Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge” is spoken of God not of Christ.⁹⁷

In Ode VIII, 9 “Hear the word of truth and receive the knowledge of the Most High” there is nothing to suggest a hypostatical conception. The same applies to IX, 1, 2 “open your ears and I shall speak to you. Give me your souls, that I may also give you my soul, the word of the Lord, and his good pleasures, the holy thought, which He has devised concerning his Messiah.” This passage, however, is interesting, because it shows how closely the poet identifies even the

⁹⁶ The best discussion of the Christology of the Odes that has come to our notice is by Batiffol in the *Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911, pp. 52–59; 161–181.

⁹⁷ Zahn says of vss. 9–13 “folgen dunkle Sätze” and seems to understand “the Father of knowledge” of God, *Neue Kirchl. Zeittch.*, 1910, p. 688. Cpr. Ode XLI, 9 “the Father of truth” of God. Harris is not explicit in his notes, but seems to apply “the Word” to Christ. Clemen thinks there is no hypostatical conception here, *Theol. Rundschau*, 1911, p. 18. Gunkel says God is referred to *Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.*, 1910 pp. 323, 327. Batiffol, *Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911, p. 47 surmises (“je crois entendre”) that the meaning is “Dieu enfante la Science en tant qu’il la parle,” and refers to Sir. 17:6; 24:3. This might do for verse 10, but in verse 11 it is not said that the Father of knowledge *speaks* the Word of knowledge, but that He *is* the Word of knowledge. If the subject is God, the Father, and “the Word” hypostatical, I do not see what else this could be but an expression of the identification of the Father and the son as regards the source of knowledge. If “the Father of knowledge” means Christ, the statement is a simple one, which affirms that in “the Word” is the source of knowledge. A difficulty lies in verse 13 where on our view Christ would be called “the pleroma of the ages and the father of them”. Still this is not in itself impossible. If Christ is the Father of knowledge because He imparts it, He can be the Father of the ages because He created them. Even the pleroma, as we know from the New Testament, has its place in Christ. Or the difficulty may perhaps be relieved by drawing verse 13^b as the subject to the following verse: “The pleroma of the ages and the Father of them has given him (= Christ) to be seen of them that are his.” This is the punctuation of Labourt *Rev. bibl. intern.*, 1910, p. 489. Harnack eliminates verses 4^b–8 as a Christian interpolation, and also verses 14, 15 and 18. On this view of course the subject becomes throughout God. But in what sense God, the Father of knowledge can be called the Word of knowledge in verse 9 Harnack does not make clear. His paraphrase of the connection between verse 3 and verse 9 covers up the difficulty: “Nun wird in Vers 9 fortgefahren—allerdings im Ausdruck etwas dunkel—dass der Vater der Erkenntniss schafft, dies durch das Wort thut” (p. 34). But the verse does not say that the Father of knowledge creates through the Word: He *is* the Word.

appellative “word” with God; it is God’s very soul, because it is his inmost thought. For the understanding of his idea of the Christ-Word this is certainly suggestive. In Ode X, 1 we have again the word in the ordinary sense of speech coming from God to the Messiah or the poet.⁹⁸ It will be observed how the hypostatical conception of “the Word” by no means interferes with speaking of a word addressed to Christ or concerning Christ. The appellative and the technical use stand side by side.

In Ode XII on the other hand we meet once more with the personal Logos. According to verse 3 ff. “the mouth of the Lord is the true Word, and the door of his light, and the Most High has given it to the worlds, which are the interpreters of his own beauty and the repeaters of his praise, and the confessors of his counsel, and the heralds of his thought, and the chasteners (or “those that keep pure”) of his servants (or “works”). For the swiftness of the Word is inexpressible, and like its expression is its swiftness and force; and its course knows no limits. Never does it fail, but it stands sure, and it knows not descent nor the way of it. For so is its work, so also its end. For it is light and the dawning of thought; and by it the worlds talk one to the other, and in the Word there were those that were silent.⁹⁹ And from it came love and concord, and they spoke one to the other whatever was theirs; and they were penetrated by the Word; and they knew him who made them, because they were in concord; for the mouth of the Most High spoke to them; and his explication ran by means of it (i.e. the Word): for the dwelling-place of the Word is man and his truth is love. Blessed are they who by means of it have understood everything, and have known the Lord in his truth.” The difference between this and Ode VII is that here the Logos, while having a similar function to there, is not definitely identified with the Christ. He creates and renders the worlds vocal so that they can praise God, produces love and concord, and light by which intelligence dawns. All this in itself might be understood on the basis of the Wisdom-theology.¹⁰⁰ Even when it is said that “the dwelling-place of the Word is man”, a parallel may be found for this in Baruch 3:37, “Afterward did she (Wisdom) appear upon earth, and was conversant with men.¹⁰¹ None the less the coincidence of all these features with the Prologue strongly suggests that the Wisdom-hypostasis and the Person of the Messiah have here grown together. That something more concrete than hypostatical Wisdom is meant seems also to follow from the form of expression in verse 3 “the mouth of the Lord is the true Word”. This can hardly mean that God speaks Wisdom; it seems to imply that the true Word acts as the mouth of God; as God creates and teaches by his mouth, so He creates and teaches per Verbum; unless the figure is a mere tautology, the Word is distinct from God. No doubt less definite Old Testament representations have here been made contributory to the description of the Word.¹⁰² But this does not warrant the assumption, that we here have a stage of the development of the Logos-idea not perceptibly in advance of the Wisdom-idea at its extreme point. The Christian Logos incorporates all the more indefinite and less concrete forms of

⁹⁸ According to some interpreters the speaking person is first the poet, then the Christ takes his place after the same immediate fashion as happens elsewhere in the Odes.

⁹⁹ So Harris and Flemming. Labourt: “et ils ont existé par le Verbe ceux qui étaient silencieux.”

¹⁰⁰ Batiffol, who so interprets it, refers to Sap. Sol. 9:1 and Sir. 42:15; 43:26. *Rev. bib. internat.* 1911, p. 190. Spitta (*Monatschr. f. Pastoralth.* VII, p. 95) ever denies the hypostatical character of the Word in this Ode.

¹⁰¹ Harris, p. 108 thinks that “the dwelling-place of the Word is man” cannot reproduce the Johannine thought of the incarnation, because the dwelling of the Logos with man is there collective, here individual. But Cpr. Rev. 3:20.

¹⁰² It is evident that besides the Wisdom-conception Psalm 19 is borrowed from.

representations of its antecedents, but does not on that account partake of the unformed state of the latter.

Ode XVI, which at first seems to take the Word in an appellative sense (verse 8: “his Spirit will utter in me the glory of the Lord and his beauty ... and the strength of his Word”), in the sequel personifies. “The Word of the Lord searches out all things both invisible and that which reveals his thought” (verse 9). “The worlds were made by his word, and by the thought of his heart” (verse 20). The association of Word and Thought as both creative mediators might seem to remind of Philo, unless in the latter there is no more than the influence of the Wisdom-doctrine.

Ode XXIX, 9, “to make war by his word and to take victory by his power” has nothing in it to suggest the personal Logos. That this, however, does not necessarily prove the personal conception to have been absent from the poet’s mind may be seen from Ode XXXIX, 8–10. Verse 8 “The Lord has bridged them (the rivers) by his word” sounds quite impersonal, and yet the poet continues: “and He walked and crossed them on foot, and his footsteps stand firm on the water”. That the pronouns here do not refer to God (as Harris by not capitalizing the word in verse 8a and by capitalizing the following pronouns represents it) but refer to the Logos seems clear from the recurrence of the “footsteps” as the footsteps of the Christ in verse 10, “And the waves were lifted up on this side and on that, but the footsteps of our Lord Messiah stand firm and are not obliterated and are not defaced”.

The most interesting statements of all are in Ode XLI, 8–17, “All those will be astonished that see me. For from another race am I: for the Father of Truth remembered me:¹⁰³ He who possessed me from the beginning: for his bounty¹⁰⁴ begat me, and the thought of his heart: and the Word is with us in all our way; the Saviour who makes alive and does not reject our souls: the man who was humbled and exalted by his own righteousness, the Son of the Most High appeared in the perfection of his Father; and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him; the Messiah is truly one; and He was known before the foundation of the world, that He might save our souls for ever by the truth of his name”. Harris well observes that the language here has its nearest parallel in the Johannine theology. Harnack observes that even here the Logos-idea is not the Hellenic one. If this means that it differs from or remains behind the Logos-conception of the Prologue, it would be difficult to point out in what respect.¹⁰⁵

Summing up we may say that in these passages of the Odes the Logos appears mainly in a functional capacity. He is the Father of knowledge; the Word of knowledge (VII, 9); He created wisdom (VII, 10); He created men (VII, 11, 15), the worlds (XVI, 11, 20); all created speech and intelligence are derived from him (XII, 3 ff.), all love and concord in the creation (XII, 9, 10). The speech and light imparted by the Logos to the world are imparted to make the world interpret

¹⁰³ Haussleiter (*Theol.-Literaturz.*, 1910, col. 273) understands verse 9 of the Christian, not of Christ. The change of the speaking subject (first person plural vss. 1–7, first person sgl. 8–10, first person plur. 11–17) is strange but not any stranger than in other Odes. Labourt: “un beau dialogue spirituel entre les chrétiens et le Verbe Rédempteur.” Harnack assigns to the Christian writer 1–7, 11, 12–17. That is to say the purely Jewish element is confined to verses 9, 10. As Fries observes (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911, p. 124) this would look like a Jewish interpolation in a Christian song.

¹⁰⁴ So Harris; Batiffol: “sa plénitude (= pleroma) m’a engendré.”

¹⁰⁵ Harnack apparently does not deny verse 15 “and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him” to the Jewish writer on account of the Logos-doctrine, but because of its concatenation with a Christian context.

God's beauty, repeat His praise, confess His counsel, herald His thoughts (XII, 4). As the Logos is from God, so his function is unto God. The Logos searches out all things in the invisible and the visible sphere (XVI, 9).¹⁰⁶ He is the revealer of God not merely in virtue of what He brings, but of what He is or becomes. (Cpr. the emphasis in Ode VII on the condescension of the incarnation in connection with the Logos-function.) More specifically soteriological functions are ascribed to the Logos. He makes a dwelling-place with man (XII, 11), he lets Himself be put on by man (VII, 6), is gracious (VII, 7, 12) gives man of his sacrifice (VII 12),¹⁰⁷ crosses the rivers for his own that they may follow after him (XXXIX, 11), is with them in all their way, a Savior, who makes alive, and does not reject their souls, saves their souls for ever by the truth of his name (XLI, 11–17).¹⁰⁸

It would, however, be scarcely correct to say that in the Odes the significance of the Logos-name is confined to the function of the Christ. It has its bearing also upon his inherent nature and relation to God. The Logos occupies quite a unique position by the side of God in the author's universe. He is not an aeon like others, one in a series, as the Gnostics conceive of their Logos.¹⁰⁹ Nor does the Logos appear on the background of the dualism of the great Gnostic systems. He is both the Creator and the incarnate One.¹¹⁰ If there is a trace of gnosticism in the Christology it must lie in the docetic traits which Batiffol thinks can perhaps be discovered in Ode XVII 4^b–6 (“I received the face and fashion of a new person ... all that have seen me were amazed: and I was regarded by them as a strange person”); XIX, 8^c (ἐγέννησεν ὡς ἄνθρωπον with the emphasis on the ὡς, not a true man; according to an emended text¹¹¹); XXII, 11 “thou hast introduced thy face (= μορφή) into the world”;¹¹² XXVIII, 14–16 (“I did not perish, for I was not their brother, nor was my birth like theirs, and they sought for my death and did not find it; for I was older than the memorial of them, and vainly did they make attack upon me”, = the impassibility of the Logos-

¹⁰⁶ Cpr. 1 Cor. 2:10 (of the Spirit of God); Heb. 4:12 of the word (logos) of God.

¹⁰⁷ Nestle (Harris p. 99) suggests that the Syriac translator here mistook οὐσία for θυσία so that the true reading should be “he granted me to ask from him and to receive from his ousia (“being” or “property”?).

¹⁰⁸ That this soteriology differs from that of the Fourth Gospel, and of the New Testament in general, by the absence of the elements of sin and forgiveness has been truly observed by Zahn and others. But the difference is of a material rather than of a formal nature.

¹⁰⁹ Cpr. Grill, *Unters.* I, 184 ff. Some approach to a Gnostic conception might seem to be made in Ode XII, 8, the aeons endowed with the Word become vocal. But cpr. Flemming-Harnack, p. 42; Harris, P. 108; Batiffol, p. 190. Gunkel (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.*, 1910, p. 328) finds an aeon Truth in Ode XXXVIII of which it is impossible to tell whether the poet conceives as an abstraction or as an hypostasis.

¹¹⁰ Batiffol, p. 162, note 2.

¹¹¹ Harris: “She brought forth as if she were a man.”

¹¹² Harris punctuates and renders quite differently: “(Thy way was without corruption) and thy place; thou didst bring thy world to corruption.”

Messiah¹¹³); XXXIII, 1 (“Grace again ran and put on corruption”),¹¹⁴ XXXIV, 5^c (“what is below is nothing but the imagination of those that are without knowledge”).¹¹⁵ Whether these observations be well-founded or not, it is certain that the divine side of the Logos-subject is magnified and emphasized by the Odes. His preëxistence is affirmed; He is older than the memorial of men, He was before them (XXVIII, 15, 17), was known before the foundation of the world (XLI, 16). Side-lights fall on His relation to God in this eternal state. God possessed him from the beginning; he was beforetime in God (XLI, 9, 15). In Ode XXXII he is even designated as “the Truth who was *self-originate*”.¹¹⁶ If we could be certain that in verses 9 and 10 of Ode XLI the speaking subject is the same Logos-Christ who is spoken of in the third person in the sequel, we would here have the ontogenetic statement “his pleroma begat me”, but as observed above (note 103), the connection is somewhat obscure.¹¹⁷ Attention should be called in this connection to the repeated association in the Odes between the “Word” and the “Thought” of God. When the same idea which finds expression in Ode IX, 1, 2 of the unhypostatical Word, viz. that it is God’s very soul, his holy inmost thought, is applied in Ode XXVIII, 17, 18 to the eternal Christ (“they sought to destroy the memorial of Him who was before them: for the Thought of the Most High cannot be anticipated: and his Heart is superior to all wisdom”), this would seem to bring us very close to an ontogenetic application of the Logos-name. As thought dawns from the Logos XII, 7, so the Logos Himself seems to proceed from the thought of the Most High.

What we have found in our rapid survey of the Logos-passages in the Odes does not favor the view, that the doctrine is here in a more primitive, more unformed stage of development than that observed in the Johannine writings, particularly in the Prologue. If anything, the statements go a shade beyond the Johannine ones in theological definiteness and suggestiveness. This is of importance to know, no matter what the outcome may be of the discussions of the experts in regard

¹¹³ Harnack, p. 61 infers from this representation, that Christ cannot be thought of as the subject. This hardly follows, even where no docetism is found here. If according to the Fourth Gospel even the believer does not truly die, how much more could this be affirmed of Christ. As a matter of fact verse 16 adds the reason: “I was older than the memorial of them.” They might kill him as a man, they could not kill his divine Person.

¹¹⁴ According to an amended text; Harris: “forsook corruption”.

¹¹⁵ For the remarks on the above passages cpr. Batiffol, pp. 55, 58, 163, 193. Also Krebs, *Freib. Theol. Stud.* 1910, II, p. 64.

¹¹⁶ According to Harris this is the rendering of the Greek αὐτοφυής used in Lact. *De Div. Inst.* I, 7 of the divine nature. Cpr. further Ode VII, 12, where, according to Nestle’s conjecture, the Logos gives men of his οὐσία (“being” or “property?”).

103 Haussleiter (*Theol.-Literaturz.*, 1910, col. 273) understands verse 9 of the Christian, not of Christ. The change of the speaking subject (first person plural vss. 1–7, first person sgl. 8–10, first person plur. 11–17) is strange but not any stranger than in other Odes. Labourt: “un beau dialogue spirituel entre les chrétiens et le Verbe Rédempteur.” Harnack assigns to the Christian writer 1–7, 11, 12–17. That is to say the purely Jewish element is confined to verses 9, 10. As Fries observes (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911, p. 124) this would look like a Jewish interpolation in a Christian song.

¹¹⁷ Spitta (*Monatsch. f. Pastoraltheol.* VII, p. 93 finds in verse 10 “Christi ewige Zeugung und Geburt” according to the presumably oldest reading in Jno. 1:13 ὃς ἐγεννήθη (instead of the plural).

to the antiquity and milieu of provenience of the Odes. For, even if the Odes, as would seem at present most likely, should be recognized as posterior to the Gospel, they remain on the dating of conservative scholars a very early witness to the ideas that were at that time associated with the Johannine Logos-doctrine, and prove that the later trinitarian use made of this doctrine by the church-theology reaches back to a point not so very far distant from the composition of the Gospel itself.

*Princeton.*¹

¹ Geerhardus Vos, "The Range of the Logos-Title in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel," *The Princeton Theological Review* XI, no. 1-4 (1913): 365-419.